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Abstract 
The fundamental concepts of any discipline ought to be examined 
periodically, not only to understand what constitutes those principles 
or concepts but also to ensure that our basic assumptions are 
logically and empirically acceptable. This thesis calls for the 
reexamination of the concept of the "individual" and of its role as 
the basic or fundamental unit of human society. Two suggestions are 
made as indications that possible alternative views are logically 
consistent with the data presently at our disposal. The first 
suggestion is that the concept of the individual in Western culture 
was formed largely as a by-product of a theological development of 
salvation or redemption in the Judeo-Christian ethos. The second 
suggestion is that the basic or fundamental human unit is not the 
familiar concept of the "individual" but that of a "biological whole" 
consisting of the mating pair or the male and the female, and the 
child. Whereas the "individual" concept is related to the idea of the 
responsibility to, and the worship of, God by each soul, the 
"biological whole" concept is based on man's genetic and social 
inheritance. 
The inheritance of the "biological whole" includes both the purely 
biological aspects and the psychical aspects. Man as an animal is 
genetically predisposed toward the maintenance and the transmission of 
life. Considering the sexual structure of man, any predisposition 
must include an attraction for "members of the opposite sex". In 
other words, in order for life to continue from one generation to 
another, because the male or female is incomplete without the opposite 
member, a "whole" must include both. Such an orientation toward a 
whole in the purely biological aspect of man can be used as the 
foundation for a psychically organic concept. Carl Jung's theory of 
the "collective unconscious" can be readily adapted to descibe how 
such an organic theory would work. The "collective unconscious" is an 
inherited part of the psyche which permeates the other two layers of 
the psyche:the personal unconscious, and the conscious. Both layers 
of the unconscious form the basis for the organic concept of mind and 
society. 
This thesis is more of a plea than an analysis, a measured 
argument or a diatribe. The plea is to those who use the forms I have 
mentioned, for much of what people accept as "factual" and use in 
learned papers and in everyday life as a "fact" ought to be 
re-examined with a critical eye. "Democracy", for instance, is a word 
or concept often used by political scientists and commentators in the 
same "factual" manner as biologists use "Ciconia ciconia". However, 
the biologist can go on to describe the "Ciconia ciconia" as the 
European white stork, and provide a detailed list of specifications of 
what constitutes a European white stork and it is a list accepted by 
any other biologist. S.I. Hayakawa, dismisses any list of 
specifications for "democracy". He has stated that when someone uses 
the word "democracy" that its "factual" content is so minimal and 
its value load is so great that to say "Lichtenstein is a democracy" 
is to indicate merely that the speaker approves of its system of 
government and very little more. 
One concept that must be a keystone in the foundation of most 
political philosophy and theory is that of the individual. To speak 
of the state, of society, of culture, of community, of the nation, of 
the clan, of government , of authority, of freedom, rights, liberties 
and justice, of the public good and private interests, in fact, almost 
any social principle, one must be able to give a definition of both 
the individual and the supra- individual entity and the relationship 
between them and between individuals. Too often a commonly accepted 
(and sometimes vague) viewpoint is assumed and much of the analysis 
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and theory is based on unknown and unexamined principles. We have 
assumed many times, in Western philosophy, that the principles 
developed in Europe over the last five hundred years are universally 
held, or would be should other cultures attain our advantage of 
knowing the truth. 
There are two purposes in this thesis: one, in section one, is to 
trace the development in Western European culture of the concept of 
the individual as the basic human unit. The other, in sections two 
and three, suggests another, more accurate basic human unit which is 
not that of the individual nor that of a holistic societal or communal 
unit in the traditional sense. Political philosophy examines a human 
universe and it is the human-in-the- world we take as a seminal or 
embryonic starting point in both sections two and three. As such, in 
order to present another view of the basic human unit, we ought to 
examine the biological aspects of man first and determine what 
biological principles are involved in the development of man. This 
examination, therefore, must be historical and descriptive because 
most of the biological development of man is beyond the empirical 
scope of the scientific method. 
Section one of this paper attempts to accomplish the first purpose 
by tracing the historical development of the concept of the 
"individual" from earliest times through to the reformation and the 
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contract theorists. At first the "individual" as a concept did not 
exist in the minds of the tribesmen, nor did the word exist in many 
languages. Distinctions about the "individual" which we feel are 
fundamental could not be thought of by other cultures. Through 
various revolutions in thought, culture and language the basic 
concept, i.e. the individual as we know it, evolved and we find that 
"the individual person is the center of the value system."1. These 
revolutions in thought accompanied theological developments in thought 
and culture and it is the argument that as one traces the development 
of Judeo-Christian ethos, one of the tendencies has been the 
development of an individual soul, responsibility, salvation, and 
relationship to God. According to the teleological requirements, the 
"individual" acquired attributes which would suit the newest 
theological views. For the concept of the individual, the high point 
in the theological development was the reformation and the emphasis 
placed on each individual's priestly authority and his responsibility 
to God alone. The political individual is the by-product of the 
theological development. Then as the hold of religion weakened, the 
"Agnostic" God of the Eighteenth century removed the individual's 
responsibility to God. Locke's individual is responsible to or 
subject to the authority of his own judgment or reason alone. It was 
the religious tendencies that loosed the authoritative hold of the 
clans, the tribes, the states, the church, and other social 
institutions, until only God himself and the individual were left as 
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existent social concepts. By the time of Kant, Bentham and Godwin, 
reason or man's own judgment was the supreme seat of authority--the 
only existent social concept. 
Before any attempt is made to examine the historical development 
of the individual, some attempt should be made to discover what the 
modern concept of the individual entails and what, if any, 
characteristics are commonly held as intrinsic to such a concept. In 
the introductory chapter, one tries to point out various principles or 
attributes that are associated most often with the concept of "the 
individual." 
Notes 
1. Dubos, Reve. Of Human Diversity. New York: Clark 
University Press, 1974, p. 10. 
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Introduction 
Political science is a strange discipline in that the area of its 
study is known, i.e., man and his relationship to man, but the object 
of its scrutiny is unidentified. A chemist knows exactly what he is 
examining, as does the astronomer, the zoologist and the geographer. 
By "knowing", I mean that there are certain definite laws, principles, 
or parameters to the subject matter that he studies. The problem 
belonging to the humanities is that we are examining ourselves and we 
don't know who we are or what we are. We don't even know what is 
intrinsic and what is not. Do we have free will? are we rational? are 
we autonomous? do we have a soul? is the "I" me or in possession of 
me? do we have rights? Many more questions of a similar nature can be 
listed. In this paper, however, I want to examine what must be the 
primary question for the political scientist and that is: When we 
examine the "man-world", is what we examine as the basic unit (1) a 
separate, autonomous, or unique individual, (2) a holistic, 
conglomerate, total, inseparable or, social "man-thing", or (3) 
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something in between, such as a group, a family, an association, or a 
community. This paper is, in fact, an examination of the concept of 
the individual: to show how the concept evolved, what the concept is 
today, how the concept should be used, and whether or not the concept 
has any meaning to the political scientist. 
The major stumbling block to philosophical thought today is the 
problem of solipsism, or how does one reach from the "I" to the 
"other". An example of the result of this strain is Robert Paul 
Wolff's statement: 
The defining mark of the state is authority, the 
right to rule. The primary obligation of man is 
autonomy, the refusal to be ruled. It would seem, 
then, that there can be no resolution of the 
conflict between autonomy... and the putative 
authority of the state. 1. 
Hobbes and Locke, starting as individualists, but with different 
views of the individual, tried to resolve that "conflict" and ended 
with theories anathema to each other. The major schools and theories 
today are attempts to bridge the chasm of solipsism by redefining the 
concept of the individual. These attempts have ranged from the 
extreme of accepting egoism and allowing for nothing more (e.g., Max 
Stirner and other extreme anarchists) to the more complex egoism of 
some existentialism (e.g., Jean- Paul Sartre), to the more collective 
yet inadequate theories of Marxism and Thomism, to the more extreme 
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mass concept of the idealists like Gentile and the Fascists and the 
"totalism" of some totalitarian ideologies. In other words, the 
answers have ranged frcm ignoring everything but oneself (Stirner) to 
ignoring the individual (Naziism). Yet, no matter how logical the 
theories may be, there is a sense of inadequacy that must strike every 
thoughtful examiner. It is not the purpose of this paper, however, to 
examine the various theories in turn to find out what is inadequate. 
That project is probably beyond the scope of any one examiner. 
When someone speaks of the individual, one has to ask for greater 
explanations to understand precisely what he means. I have 
accumulated quite a variety of definitions of "individual" and of 
"individuality" (which seem to be interchangeable or dominating 
attributes of the other). "Individuals are units that have rights"; 
"Ontological concept of man has the concrete being of the individual 
and his relational existence"; and the individual is a "centre or 
spring of egotistic desire". The individual has any number of 
attributes: uniqueness, reason, will, material, moral unity, 
originality, historicity, independence, autonomy, unity, relationality 
(or the focus of relations), creativity and so on. Individuals are 
also described not so much by what they are but by what they do. 
Expressions such as self-expression of intent, self-assertion, 
self-regulating system, self-determinism, are common. The individual 
is subject i.e. acts on, for objects; the individual projects himself; 
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the individual lives his being, all indicating that there is no one 
definition of "individual" or that he is goal oriented, and that to 
know what the individual is, an observer must do his best to see the 
individual in practice. It is an open concept yet others insist on a 
more closed concept such as "self-sufficing", "self-subsistent", etc. 
it is confusing and disturbing. 
In investigating the relationships between the 
individual and society, our point of departure -
only an empirical one - is the individual man; he 
thinks and acts and always co-operates with others 
within some social framework, but is a distinct 
individual.... When the individual is treated as 
the starting point of our analysis we must not 
forget that his autonomy is only relative. This is 
not a mysterious monad of will and consciousness, 
isolated and deprived of contact with others; this 
is a social individual, because, unable to live 
without society, he is - since the moment of birth 
- shaped by_ society and is its product physically 
and spiritually.2. 
It is interesting that Adam Schaff is unable to state what it is 
he is talking about, except in negative tones. The individual is 
distinct yet acts and thinks socially: he is an individual empirically 
yet his autonomy is only relative, and he is unable to live without 
society, etc. He seems to be using individualistic terms holistically. 
In this section, I want to take a look at this being who is both 
distinct and not distinct at the same time. 
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The word "individual" comes from the Latin word "individuus" 
meaning "indivisible", i.e., "not-to-divide". As an adjective it has 
the following meanings: 
1. Existing as a unit; single. 2. Separate, as 
distinguished from others of the same kind; 
particular: "individual" voters. 3. pertaining to 
or meant for a single person, animal, etc.: an 
"individual" serving. 4. Differentiated from 
others by peculiar or distinctive characteristics: 
an individual style. 5. Obsolete Incapable of 
being divided; inseparable. 
And as a noun: 
1. A single human being as distinct from others. 
2. A person. 3. Biol. a. A plant or animal 
existing and functioning independently, b. A single 
member of a compound organism, especially one 
forming part of a hydrozoan colony. - Although 
"individual" is often used as a synonym for 
"person" many careful writers use it only when 
there is emphasis upon individuality or when a 
single person is in contrast with a body: The 
members of a group are also "individuals". 3. 
From such a series of definitions, we can pick out certain tendencies 
or concepts that the word "individual" contains. Two tendencies 
dominate- "separateness", and, "completeness". Adam Schaff tries to 
impress the distinction between the two concepts on the mind of the 
reader. For him the individual is "distinct", i.e., he has 
separate-qualities that set one apart from others, yet the individual 
is "social", i.e., unable to live without society. However, he adds a 
third concept "Autonomy" i.e. "self-governing", claiming that the 
individual's "autonomy" is relative and linked to his "distinctness". 
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Schaff also notes that the empirical starting point for the concept of 
the individual is the "separateness" or "distinctness" linked to or 
synonymous with "autonomy". 
The Thomists, such as Jacques Mar i tain, claim that the 
"individual" can be defined as being distinct from others (tree, 
horse, man, angel, stone) while a "person" is an individual of 
rational or intellectual nature (man or angel) and a "human person" is 
an individual of a human rational nature.4. In such a classification, 
the purely material or empirical considerations of the first level 
relate to "distinctness" or "separateness", while the next category 
relates to "autonomy" (Reason being the prime necessity for autonomy). 
The "person" is capable of responsibility (whereas the simple 
"individual" is not) and "freedom" is the distinguishing mark of man's 
nature.5. For the Thomist, and for Kant,6 autonomy has, as its 
foundation, reason and is, in turn, the foundation for morals. The 
"person", the social, moral, ethical, conceptual aspect of human kind, 
is distinguised by "freedom", a free choice, or as Jaspers puts it, 
the liberty or power of "self-transcendence". 7. Heidegger's 
"lived-world" concept also expresses the idea of the "person" working 
on a canvass of material things of which the "self" or the empirical 
individual human is one. 
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Emmanuel Mounier and Thomas Hobbes speak of the "individual" in 
negative, atomistic, egoistic tones. Mounier adds that the 
"individual" is the selfish, materialistic personality isolated by 
matter, while the "person" is the moral, spiritual human kind, having 
conquered the mere "self". For Mounier, Maritain, Jaspers, the 
existentialists and others, the distinction between "individual" and 
"person" (or similar terms) does not result in two distinct beings. By 
reason, or autonomy, or free choice etc., the "person" transcends the 
"individual" but in no way separates from the "individual". 
Now, we have four concepts that, unfortunately, are often viewed 
synonymously: the individual has individuality, personality, autonomy 
and being. At this point, the Thomist, the existentialists, and 
others, would try to unravel the definitional problem by examing the 
concept of "Freedom" and applying it to human kind. However, the 
examination of the nature of "freedom" already includes several 
assumptions about the human being and so we possibly can end in a 
circular argument. We must try to deal with the concept of "the 
individual" itself. 
There are two concepts "individual" and "individuality" which are 
often treated synonomously and at other times not. Individuality is 
used in many ways: it is those traits that distinguish one person or 
thing from others; or it is the state of having separate, independent 
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existence. However, authors use "individuality" in a great variety of 
ways, from physical separateness: 
...individuality means the presence of barriers and 
boundaries, a radical otherness with respect to 
individual centers and foci. Individuality denotes 
that which limits, impedes, and disrupts 
homogeneity and continuity. 8. 
to the personality in a physical being: 
...individuality is the personality vis-a-vis 
society and the state. Individuality is the sign 
of the persona, and it always finds its claims in 
the higher sanctions of the latter. 9. 
Individuality when it is identified as "the possession of 
distinctiveness by members of the human family" 10 i.e., a variety of 
uniqueness or as a "psychosocial phenomenon involving a complex set of 
interactions between the normalizing influences of the social group 
and the innate or acquired drive to be oneself," 11 has a similarity 
to the Thomist definition of the person. The individuality is an 
achievement of life processess or the social persona which is involved 
with the more material individual. The individual has the more 
metaphysical sense of being a separate and distinct existence. It is 
the "thing" and "individuality" is the personality or the truly human 
part of man. It is the individuality that provides man the logical 
and moral unity that allows him to be an end in himself and not means 
for something else. "Individiuality", then, is the basis for that 
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which is uniquely human, and uniqueness, as I will point out, is a 
variety of the concept of autonomy. On the other hand, whenever 
"individuality" is related more to the physical aspects than to the 
person, then it takes on a different value. "Separateness", 
"apartness", "distinctness", are more akin to its non- personality 
meaning. In this paper, I .shall use autonomy for the personality 
aspect of individuality, and individual for the more physical aspect 
of individuality. 
"Uniqueness" has the tone of unrepeatability, i.e. that the 
charactersitics or the set of characterstics which one individual 
contains will never reoccur again. The physical appearance, the 
genetic structure, the mental predispositions and processes , the 
memories and experiences will never occur exactly as they are in one 
person. For that reason, many believe we will never know what the 
human individual is because each is different from the others. When I 
look at my hands, I recognize that the left is different from the 
right, yet I would not treat a broken finger in the left hand while 
leaving a broken finger in the right untreated on the grounds that 
each is unique and I hadn't studied the right hand finger. No 
geologist studies but one piece of granite and not others on the 
grounds that each is unique. Research scientists do not study 
tuberculosis in each and every person on the grounds that each person 
or individual is unique. If a child is born without arms, we do not 
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say of that child he is not human or that he is of a different 
species, yet he would be unique. What then is meant when the 
individual is described as "unique"? The fact that no two people have 
the same fingerprints, voiceprints, or brainwave patterns may be 
useful cateloguing people or things but does little to help the study 
of man. It would be hard to find anything in this world that is 
identical in everyway (except time and space) to another thing yet we 
seldom bother to think of the minute differences when collecting new 
stamps or new coins, or when we examine a type of bacteria or virus. 
When asked what an author means by "uniqueness" in human beings, I 
am sure that not one of them would demonstrate the uniqueness of 
fingerprints or elbows or hair numbers in the scalp. It is doubtful 
that they would suggest physical appearance as the source of the 
"uniqueness". The most common answer would probably be connected to 
the mind or the brain, or processes of either. Some would answer that 
the experiences of each individual are unique; or that the values of 
each are unique; or that the desire, goals, thoughts, etc. are unique. 
All we can do then is to describe the unique character to the best of 
our ability and leave it at that. The examination of those unique 
characteristics are best left to the biographers, poets and lovers 
(who are in turmoil over every thought of their loved one). Yet the 
authors are not content merely to point out the unique characterstics! 
More often than not, they wish to make a general statement about the 
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important or substantive uniqueness (i.e., uniqueness excluding 
differences like hair colour or fingerprints etc). The unique 
cliaracteristic s contribute something or are instrumental in creating 
something important or essential for that individual, and even for 
every individual. (Often, whatever characteristic is unique in one 
individual is unique in every individual. For instance, everyone has 
fingerprints, yet each is unique to one individual.) I must conclude, 
therefore, that what is meant by uniqueness in individuals is that 
there are characteristics or attributes which belong to man as a whole 
but which exhibit themselves uniquely in every individual. The 
attribute of memory is in every human yet what each individual 
remembers is different. A statement then can be made about the 
importance of the unique exhibition of an attribute for the 
development, or existence of each individual and of man as a whole. 
When the original claim of the "unique individual" was made, some 
importance was attached to certain characteristics being allowed to 
exhibit themselves without hindrances, otherwise little or no 
importance would have been attached to "uniqueness". The attribute or 
characteristic may involve goals, self-achievement or fulfillment, 
values, decisions, morals and responsibility and so on. Each involves 
reason, judgement, will, choice etc. i.e., functions of the mind in 
and for itself. Consequently for the purposes of this paper, I treat 
uniqueness as a variety of the concept "autonomy" i.e., a self-
regulating being. 
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Josiah Royce has an implicit concept of the individual that 
follows the reasoning that I have outlined above . He starts out as 
follows: 
So that to exist implies...to be different from the 
rest of the world of existences. And since I must 
exist if I am to have any qualities whereby I can 
resemble another being, and must differ from all 
other beings if I am to exist, it naturally seems 
that my differences from all the rest of the world 
is, in a sense, the deepest truth about me.... By 
an individual...we mean an essentially unique 
being, or a being such that there exists, and can 
exist, but one of the type constituted by this 
individual being. 12. 
Later on, however, he makes the following claims: 
...I hold the concept of individuality...in itself, 
essentially and altogether, a teleological 
concept...implying that the facts of any world 
where there really are individuals express will and 
purpose. 13. 
And, more baldly: 
An individual is a being that adequately expresses 
a purpose. 14. 
At first it was the uniqueness of characteristics that he claims 
make the individual. Later, in order to present a coherent theory, he 
choses what he deems to be essential and arrives at a teleologically 
oriented or purposive being, i.e. a concept closely related to, if not 
an attribute of, autonomy. Autonomy is a concept that includes such 
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items as self-regulation, self government, self -rule, etc., and it 
usually includes a vague notion of independence. An autonomous 
region, for example, will make its own laws and enforce them without 
aid or interference from outside governments, yet will still be 
considered a part of a whole. Kant had a more precise use of the 
concept when he applied it to humans and human thinking: 
...subject only to his own, yet universal, 
legislation, and ... he is only bound to act in 
accordance with his own will, which is, however 
designed by nature to be a will giving universal 
laws. 15. 
... man and, in general, every rational being 
exists as an end in himself and not merely as a 
means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will. 
16. 
The independence that results from the autonomy of human thinking, is 
not a substantive concept in that the human mind has no choice to be 
independent. It simply is. For Kant, the human mind can only think 
in certain ways or patterns which he labeled "categories", and it is 
impossible to break through those patterns or categories. This does 
not mean that a human being cannot submit to another, it is just that 
the choice to submit is the result of an independent action, and that 
act of submission becomes the basis of the rules which the human has 
adopted for himself. His autonomy is still intact because he has 
chosen to adopt submissive rules for himself and he continues to 
choose the rules throughout his submission. The existentialists 
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picked up on this point and formed a ne\tf movement around that central 
core. 
The inability of the human to break through the categories or 
patterns of the mind, indicates a definite limitation in the freedom 
of thought, and the range of human reason. These limitations indicate 
that the role of 'autonomy' must in turn be restrained if not 
drastically curtailled. Man cannot be autonomous or self-regulating, 
which involves an element of will or reason, if there are structural 
limitations imposed prior to reason, and prior to will. With such 
limitations, autonomy can occur when the structure of his o\m mind 
allows it. It is common knowledge, today, that many people suffer 
from cumpulsions whose source is the unconscious. The unconscious is 
outside the control of reason or the awareness of the conscious, and, 
as such, must be considered a further limitation on the rule of 
autonomy. 
Autonomy, as a concept, is a view of man and his judgment that is 
more acceptable to the protestant view in which each individual is a 
morally responsible unit. Each soul is responsible for its own sins 
and its own salvation, i.e., responsible to have faith, to believe, to 
choose to be "born again". Calvin's doctrine of the elect is a more 
convoluted version of the same thing. Arminianism is an extreme view 
in which each soul must always choose because he is always responsible 
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for sins and for his choice to "be saved". The responsible soul 
requires autonomy in order for it to choose faith and salvation. In 
the Middle Ages, the scolastics required a fierce debate over "free or 
autonomous will" in order to speak of God's relationship to man and 
the meaning of the death of Jesus on the cross. By the sixteenth 
century, the doctrine of "free will" had won universal acceptance. By 
the time Deism had eliminated an all-knowing, all-caring God from the 
concept of the individual, the basic characteristics of an autonomous 
individual were well established. The individual had reason, will, 
judgment, etc., and for those reasons he was subject to no other man. 
The basic principle of man must be found trithin man himself, and not 
in another man, entity, or being. 
Peter McCormick claims that the concept of autonomy occurs 
whenever there is a breakdown of a highly integrated society. 
Historically and existentially, society comes before any individual 
and assigns him an identity but with a collapse of that society the 
individual is left on his own. The individual starts to perceive of 
himself as an "autonomous, differentiated, self-starting individual. 
However, 
...the individual is not a raw datum, not a 
conceptual starting point, not a simple "given" to 
human experience, but a conceptual construction of 
considerable complexity emerging from a specific 
type of social experience, namely the experience of 
social breakdown. 17. 
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Should McCormick's claim (and that of Michael Oakeshott whom McCormick 
acknowledges as the source of the idea) have any validity, then 
autonomy has the similar root causes as some varieties of Durkheim's 
anomie. The problem, not discussed by McCormick, is whether or not 
such a collapse is in the natural order of things, i.e. , a natural 
step in the evolving nature of man. 
As a consequence of defining the human individual as unique, 
distinct, autonomous, separate, etc., society has had to be defined in 
such a manner as to accommodate the meaning of the "individual". 
Society, then, becomes an aggregate of individuals, or of individuals 
and relations. Its existence is attributable to the creative mind of 
every individual, or in other words, society is a rational construct. 
The focus of what is human centers on the individual and society is 
the means or the instrument through which individuals live together 
and achieve values, goals, normally outside the grasp of any one 
individual. 
To sum up the aspects of "individual", we have arrived at a 
postion where there are two streams of meanings. On the one hand, the 
individual is distinct, separate, complete in itself, unrepeatable, 
i.e., subject to spatio-temporal location. It is itself and not 
another thing ,physically finite, and as such a self-maintaining 
structure. 18 On the other hand, it is autonomous, unique, 
self-regulating, whose roots are in the human mind. 
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There are two objections to both streams of thought. As a 
biological organization man is a living thing and any deep disturbance 
in his "component parts is likely to affect the health and even the 
viability of the whole organism". 19. Should a death, divorce, loss 
of job, illness to a loved one, etc. occur in the life of the 
individual, the health of the individual is affected - enough of such 
incidents and the individual can die. Somehow, the biological man is 
linked to entities outside the individual. The second objection is 
that such definitions are static. The human is a "coordinated stream 
of personal experiences" which is his "thread of life". 20. The 
human individual is as much a continuity as is society. How the 
process of both continuities are involved cannot be answered in the 
static manner of an isolate individual. 
We usually speak of "individual" in contradistinction to 
"society", yet whatever "society" may be, it is linked more closely to 
"person" and "personality". The concept itself had little meaning 
until the end of the Middle Ages. The rise of the importance of reason 
or judgement as an end for humanity gave each human an importance and 
a value beyond the considerations of society. The Revolution in 
thought, reflected in Descartes' Meditations, conceptually divided the 
human into parts resulting in such problems as the mind/body dualism. 
22 
Conceptually, the ancient Jews (and perhaps the modern Semitics) 
were unable to divide the human into various parts. Only with the 
advent of the ancient Greeks and dialectic reasoning, could the 
various aspects of the human be thought of as things. The soul could 
exist, and, indeed, did exist without the body, according to Plato's 
teaching in the Phaedo. The concentration of man's search for 
knowledge on the human, advocated by Socrates and the Sophists, 
enabled the Greeks to divide the human into two basically distinct 
parts: 1) the body, i.e. the material, crass, entity of feelings and 
emotions, and, 2) the soul, i.e. the reasoning, contemplating, judging 
entity of logic, laws and knowledge. With the advent of Christianity 
and a new emphasis on personal salvation, the soul became the entity 
of primary importance, but it too was divided into two parts: 1) the 
soul, i.e., the eternal spirit encompassing the divine linking the 
individual to the "universalis fidelis", and, 2) reason or judgment. 
The importance of these new conceptually distinct entities can be 
seen by the effect they had on medieval thought. St. Thomas wrote: 
the knowable object is proportioned to the 
knowing power. Now, there are three levels of 
knowing powers. One kind of knowing power is the 
act of a corporeal organ, namely sensation. 
Therefore, the object of any sensitive potency is 
the form as it exists in corporeal matter. Since 
this kind of matter is the principle of 
individualism, every power of the sensitive past of 
the soul is able to know particular things only. 
Another kind of knowing power is that which is 
neither the act of a corporeal organ nor in any way 
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associated with corporeal matter: the angelic 
intellect, for instance. So, the object of this 
knowing power is a form subsisting apart from 
matter; although they may know material things, 
they see them in immaterial beings - either in 
themselves, or in God. Now, the human intellect 
occupies a middle position: it is not the act of 
any organ, yet it is a power of the soul which is 
the Form of of the body, as we explained 
previously.21. 
St. Thomas, however, applied the name "man" to both the body and the 
soul together and not to either one alone. The Platonic idea of a soul 
"trapped" in a body was unacceptable to him but not to his 
predecessors. St. Thomas did believe there was a real distinction 
between the soul and the faculties. The faculties themselves were 
divided into parts: the vegetative faculties, concerned with 
nutrition, growth, reproduction; the sensitive faculties, such as 
sight, hearing, smell etc. and imagination, memory, etc.; and the 
rational faculties. He also claims that man is free because he is 
rational.22. 
Although St. Thomas differentiated various aspects of man yet 
tried to keep man as a unit, Descartes rent the aspects asunder. The 
bodily faculties and the mental Faculties could not be trusted. Only 
the thinking "I" could be known as certain. Descartes spoke of the 
relationship of the "I" and the body as comparable to that of a 
"pilot" at the wheel of a ship. After his Meditations, and with the 
advent of secularism, the mind or reason (soul) and the body were 
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considered to be two distinct entities, if not two distinct existents. 
Gilbert Ryle labeled the concept as "The Official Doctrine".23. In it, 
human bodies are in space and subject to mechanical laws of spacial 
objects, whereas minds are not in space or subject to mechanical laws. 
The body and its actions can be observed by others yet the mind 
cannot. 
Without labeling myself as a Thomist or something else, and for 
the purposes of this paper only, I wish to assume that the "mind" or 
"person", is as inextricably a part of a human, as is the body. 
(Strawson's Individuals gives an excellent, if imperfect, argument for 
this position.) The "mind", the "will", the "consciousness", the 
"body" etc. are merely aspects of what is human and the splits or 
gulfs between them are without foundation in reality. 
There is a sense of inadequacy in our concept of the individual. 
For hundreds of years, Western culture has sought to find the basic 
ingredients in the concept and has failed. The failure led to the 
"unbeing", the "Nothingness" of the existentialists (particularly 
Sartre) with its accompanying 'dread', 'nausea', 'fear and loathing 
unto death', that any peasant would reject with the contempt it 
deserves. The failure permeates all of western thought so that 
philosophical, humanist and cultural thought has stagnated. Using the 
newest teciinological instruments, we probe and examine the lump that 
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is man in the same manner as an archeologist probes and examines a 
shard of pottery. What fits with our preprogrammed assumptions is 
accepted. What does not is thrown back into the dirt. We examine the 
remains of man and assume that that is all there is to man. 
Whitehead said once that scientists may examine a dead cat -
measure and record all its organs, fibres, tendons, bones and flesh 
but when they are done they still would not have a cat, a live 
creature that purred, meowed, rubbed its coat against your leg or 
flicked its tail as it hunted. Using the scientific methods only we 
know so little of man. Concepts such as 'Reason,* 'Consciousness', 
'Soul', 'Feeling', in fact, almost all the concepts that we consider 
human, lie outside the scope of science as we know it today. This is 
particularily so of the concept of human 'life' and the human 
'individual'. 
The concept of the "individual" has many meanings and variations 
of meanings but, when speaking of human beings, we usually have two 
things in mind: 1) being a distinct entity and 2) acting according to 
one's own will and for one's own ends. The human individual is 
regarded as a unit and as an agent at the same time. Other cultures 
and other time periods had different views of man. Tribesmen often are 
unable to distinguish themselves apart from the tribe. The ancient 
Greeks were unable to separate the "citizen" and the "state". The 
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tendency is to believe that other cultures are simply not as 
"advanced" as ours. A belief in "progress" allows us to assume that 
our culture is the most "civilized" and "advanced" the world has ever 
seen, and, as such, our concepts are much nearer to the "actual truth 
or nature" of man. A culturally "blind" man is also an ignorant man so 
any concept under analysis must be bared of all possible assumptions 
(at least to the best of one's ability). 
The Jewish people were unable to separate the various parts of the 
individual,unlike the Greeks or ourselves. When we speak of the soul, 
the Semitic speaking person speaks of the inner aspects of the whole 
man, because the whole man is a unit. We can separate the mind, the 
soul, the body, the will, reason, etc. from the individual and from 
each other. The Old Testament Jews would find these concepts to be 
completely beyond their ken. The difference between the contemplation 
of the Greeks and that of the Taoists and other oriental groups was 
that, for the orientals, contemplation was a means of purging 
themselves of the material in order to be at one with the One, the 
Universal Being or Spirit; while for the Greeks, contemplation was a 
means of understanding nature and oneself. It is the difference 
between mysticism and science. The oriental desired to merge with the 
whole, beyond himself, while the Greeks thought of universals and 
particulars and man. The one relied on the non-rational and the 
'Universal Being', the other relied on judgment and himself. 
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It is , of course, an exaggeration to polarize eastern and Greek 
culture in such a manner yet the tendencies toward such polar results 
were there. In the western world, Augustine and the early fathers of 
the church were able to repress reason's or judgment's role in western 
culture, but for St. Thomas and many other eminent thinkers of the 
dying middle Ages and early Renaissance, judgement had become a key 
concept. Augustinanism no longer dominated the western world. 
Max Weber developed a theory around the Protestant work ethic to 
explain the remarkable technological and economic differences between 
countries such as Italy and England or Spain and Holland. However, the 
Protestant Reformation reflected a crisis in Western culture. It is no 
accident that the Reformation occurred after the printing press was 
invented for learning was the key to its success. For Calvin, in 
particular, the final earthly authority was the individual's 
conscience, that is, his judgement concerning God's will. Each man had 
to know what God wanted man to do, hence the need to read and study 
the Bible, hence the need for education and printing. 
Marsilius, William of Ockham and the Renaissance writers differ 
remarkably from John of Salisbury and other thinkers of his time 
because of a new identity of the human being through his judgement and 
his reason. More's Utopia and Bacon's Novum Organum contain numerous 
references to false myths, false idols and so on. Only man's reason 
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applied to the world was the final arbiter. Bacon consciously 
rejected Aristotle and Plato to found the basis for a new thought. 
Both More and Bacon, but more particularly Bacon, witnessed the change 
from the Aristotelian-Scholastic logical tradition to a newer or 
modern view in the British Universities, which depended on, as the 
ultimate authority, 'clear and distinct' ideas. 
Descartes summarized the new attitude in a bare yet explicit 
proposition "cogito ergo sum". By his method, which is basically the 
method adopted by western culture, the only and ultimate authority for 
everything (and by this I do not mean the ultimate cause or creator or 
whatever) is reason: I'm reasoning, therefore I am. I know I exist 
because thinking is the one thing I can be sure that is absolutely 
beyond doubt. However, in order to follow Descartes' method, I had to 
place aside everything that I cannot be sure of: the senses, the body, 
the thoughts of my mind. 
I rightly conclude that my essence consists solely 
in the fact that I am a thinking thing... And 
although possibly... I possess a body with which I 
am very intimately conjoined, yet because, on the 
one side, I have a clear and distinct idea of 
myself in as much as I am only a thinking and 
unextended thing, and as, on the other, I possess a 
distinct idea of body, in as much as it is only an 
extended and unthinking thing, it is certain that 
this I that is to say, my soul by which I am what 
I am , is entirely and absolutely distinct from my 
body, and can exist without it.24. 
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Westen thought had reached the point where the 'individual' is 
divided. The Semitic people would find this concept completely beyond 
them. 
Science at the present moment is able to make head transplants 
from one body to another. Soon, no doubt, scientists will be able to 
place the head of one person on the body of another. Should the body 
of the donor die, do we consider the person 'A' dead although his head 
will still be alive on another body? How would we solve the matter of 
identity? Descartes believed that the identity of a person was 
contained in the "I" that inhabited the body, and that the "I" did not 
need the body to exist. We, in our present culture, may believe that 
the "I" needs the body to exist, yet our science fiction is repleat 
with examples of mind transplants, souls or minds inhabiting other 
bodies etc. I am certain that should the life of the body be opposed 
to the thoughts and actions of the mind, most people would choose the 
latter. However, should a person try to kill his body to release his 
soul, we would judge him insane and send him to psychiatric treatment. 
A child, so severely retarded that it is more a lump of flesh than a 
human, cannot be mistreated or destroyed because of the "rights" it 
has, or the humanity it has, and so on. 
Nobody doubts that every individual human being has a value simply 
because he exists as a human being. Variations of this theme have 
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existed throughout recorded history. However, the source or principle 
upon which the value is founded differ profoundly. In Genesis, God 
created man in his own image and for that reason man was valuable. He 
did not belong to himself - he belonged to God. For Aristotle, the 
individual was of value as a citizen, that is, he belonged to the 
state. While for Plato, in the Republic, the individual fulfills only 
part of the function of the state, he can do his part in the harmony 
of the state only when he himself has the self-control or temperance 
to be in harmony with himself.25. For the early Christians, he was of 
value because Jesus had died for man and every soul was sacred. In the 
Middle Ages, the individual belonged to the 'body of the Faithful", to 
the church which was now 'the body of Christ'. The believer was part 
of a unit. 
Luther changed the concept, or at least, represents a change in 
the concept so that the individual no longer is a part of a unit. The 
concept of the individual stood out above the crowd and started to 
dominate the western cultural thought. Individual will and judgment 
were suddenly very important. The individual was important for two 
reasons: 1) Jesus had died on the cross for every sinner, and 2) every 
person could choose to believe and accept or not. In the Middle Ages, 
it was not the person who was important but the office he held. By the 
time of the Reformation, however, the individual was as important as 
the office he held, if not more so. 
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The concept of the "individual" seems to have evolved as a moral 
concept centered on the principle of "redemption" - a key principle in 
Christianity. "Redemption" required something to be redeemed - the 
soul, something to be redeemed "from" - sin, and a means of redemption 
- Christ's blood and an individual moral responsibility. No other 
major religion (that I know of) has such a program. As a result, there 
was no need to develop the concept of the "individual" with its 
accompanying moral accoutrements. Taoism emphasized individual 
contemplation and a good life, but this was required in order to "see" 
behind the "presented" world and merge with the "Universal Principle" 
or "Universal Being". 
In the first part of the paper, the development of the 
"individual" as a moral concept, first with theological implications, 
then social implications, and finally with political implications, 
will be examined. The development of the "individual" benefitted from 
conceptual developments other than moral but these additions were used 
to augment the dominant moral theme. These additional concepts were a 
new view of nature and of the state by the Greeks, a different concept 
of law and of personal allegiance in the Medieval Age, and a new means 
of communication and a new view of science in the Renaissance. Part I 
of the paper, then, is a history of the development of the concept of 
the individual. 
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There is a problem of "identity". When we view "man", are we 
culturally "preprogrammed " to see an "individual" with all the 
emotional overtones that that concept evokes? Is the "individual" of 
value because he has an individual soul (as Luther claimed)? because 
he is a morally responsible being (as St. Thomas and Luther claimed)? 
or because he is an autonomous reasoning being (as Kant claimed)? 
Others, however, believe that the "individual", as depicted above, is 
a fallacy and that his value is only as a part of a greater entity. 
Part II examines the "individual" to discover his "true material" 
nature and whether or not he is an "individual" to begin with. Part 
III continues that examination, but focuses on the "higher faculties" 
such as consciousness, reason, conscience, and so on. 
In our examination of the concept of the "individual", I shall try 
to avoid an error pointed out by Nietzsche: 
All philosophers share this common error: they 
proceed from contemporary man and think they can 
reach their goal through analysis of this man. 
Automatically they think of "man" as an eternal 
verity, as something abiding in the whirlpool, as a 
sure measure of things. Everything that the 
philosopher says about man, however, is at bottom 
no more than a testimony about the man of a very 
limited period. Lack of a historical sense is the 
original error of all philosophers....26. 
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PART ONE 
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Individualism exists in many areas of study: political, religious, 
economic, scientific, etc. For the purposes of this paper, only the 
political aspects of the concept will be examined. This is not a 
claim that the political "individual" can be separated in reality, for 
man has many roles; it is only a limitation or a boundary for our 
examination or our focus of attention. The religious aspect will be 
brought into our focus only insofar as that aspect affects the 
political aspect. As a political concept, individualism is not a 
unit. There are a number of strands of thought running through the 
concept with numerous qualities or attributes with a theoretical range 
from German Romanticism to anarchistic individualism. Each strand has 
a basic root which we will examine and then we will examine the 
strands themselves. The hope is that we can see how the concept 
attained its basic structure today by examining its past roots as well 
as the more recent history in Europe and North America. 
Traditional Man. 
It is unfortunate that the ancient world is passed by in the 
realms of political theory and political history, for there occurred, 
in the ancient worlds, four significant changes, indeed revolutions, 
in thought that were to have great significance on the political life 
of the western world. That the political and social thought of the 
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western world is different from that of China or India rests on these 
four pillars. The Jewish people are usually credited for the gifts of 
"one god" and a religious tradition. The concept of "one god" is an 
important gift, yet two other concepts: an "individualized" God; and 
a separation of divine and civic law, - were also inherited from the 
Jews, and these latter two concepts are most important in political 
and social thought. Another nation, the Greeks, reinforced the 
concept of the separation of divine and civic laws, and added a third 
change, a bifurcation of the state, as a concept, and religion, as a 
concept. The fourth change involved man as a subject of study. In 
Greece, Socrates epitomizes a change in Greek thinking. Unlike Homer, 
Thales, and other older thinkers, Socrates did not study the gods, nor 
the world alone, he asked questions of man. As a result new ideas of 
"justice", "good", "community", etc., emerged on the forefront of 
man's intellectual questing. Jesus, with his emphasis on grace and 
personal salvation, reinforced the prominance of the fourth change in 
western civilization. 
Hubert Butterfield recognized the importance of the individual's 
conscience throughout western civilization: 
... the weapon that Christianity always holds in 
reserve, namely the willingness to accept 
martyrdom. In the last resort the Christian has 
had one thing to say to society in every age of 
history and sometimes he has had to say it to 
other Christians when they were untrue to their 
principles and were trying to force his conscience. 
38 
He has said: "I will worship God, even if you kill 
me... 1 
The modern "relation" to that "weapon" must be the non-violent 
campaigns of Gandhi and Martin Luther King. King wrote: 
I submit that an individual who breaks a law that 
conscience tells him is unjust, and willingly accepts 
the penalty by staying in jail to arouse the conscience 
of the community over its injustice, is in reality 
expressing the very highest respect for law. Of 
course, there is nothing new about this kind of civil 
dis- obedience. It xvas seen sublimely in the refusal 
of Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego to obey the laws of 
Nebuchadnezzar because a higher moral lax* was involved. 
2. 
In both quotes, there are two principles involved: the conscience 
of the individual, and the separation of divine and civil laws. At 
one time, morality, ethics, conscience, and the worship of God, were 
external to the personality of the individual. The tribe was the 
whole for the individual. The individual's consciousness was confined 
to, and submerged in, the tribal consciousness. Every member of the 
tribe considered himself as the descendent of, the child of, in the 
family of, etc., the tribal god or gods. The god was the god of the 
tribe, not the individual. When a member was expelled or left the 
tribe, he lost his god, and the tribe would say: "Go, serve other 
gods." 3. Ruth performed a similar ritual when she said to Naomi: 
"Interest me not to leave thee, or to return from following after 
thee: for whither thou goest, I will go; and where thou lodgest, I 
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will lodge: thy people shall be my people, and thy God my God" 4. 
(emphasis added). 
In the early civilizations of Mesopotamia, the individual had no 
intrinsic value as an end in himself. A "characteristic of these 
civilizations was a tendency to identify religious values with those 
immanent to the social order." 5. The state was governed by "the 
assembly of the gods"; "the gods own the land, the big estates"; and 
man was created by the gods so "his purpose is to serve the gods". (6) 
The whole aim of the state was to benefit the gods, not the members of 
the state. In Egypt, the religious institutions were almost as 
powerful. In the third kingdom, a god-king ruled the state and other 
national gods supported his rule. The temples owned one out of every 
five inhabitants, and one-third of the cultivatable land. (7) 
Opportunistic individuals, noble and poor, defied the rule of the 
pharaohs, until the strain broke Egypt into ivarring factions. (8) 
However, the new petty princes and land barons took to extremes the 
personal rule of the old pharaohs, and anarchy prevailed. Law, as a 
concept separate from the concept of divine proclamation or 
principles, was lacking, and never managed to be a part of Egyptian 
culture. As a result, law (and therefore order and stability) was 
always "part and parcel" of the divine order - i.e. the god-king and 
the temples. Egyptian political culture could not be conceived apart 
from the pharaohs as god-kings. It can be no accident that Egypt 
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remained relatively quiet under Roman rule after Cleopatra lost her 
kingdom to Augustus. Caesar had been made a god in Egypt and, after 
his death, throughout Rome; Augustus was his nephew and heir and he 
too was created a god after his death. Soon every emperor was made a 
god. The line of divinity was continued in Egypt and so was the law. 
The Jewish nation was founded on the belief that God chose them as 
His people (belonging to Him) and a covenant (9) was set up between 
God and His people, i.e. the nation as a whole. "And I will make my 
covenant between me and thee, and will multiply thee exceedingly." 
The Jewish nation was called "the seed of Abraham". The God was the 
"God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob" for these were the fathers i.e. 
leaders of the Jewish people. The law (Torah) was the divine 
proclamations that applied to the nation as a whole. The executions 
were done by stoning, in which all take part. (10) When a murder or 
other crime was perpetrated, the community or tribe was also 
responsible. For an unsolved murder, the elders of the community had 
to go through a purification ritual. (11) When the concubine of a 
Levite was raped and killed by a few men in Gibeah, a city belonging 
to the Benjamites, the Levite cut up the woman in twelve pieces and 
sent one piece to each of the tribes of Israel. The other tribes felt 
obligated to form an 'assembly of the people of God'. They asked the 
Benjamites to give up the men who had done the deed, but the 
Benjamites would not give up members of their tribe. As a result, the 
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other tribes fought the Benjamites, defeated them and burned their 
cities. The destruction was so great that it was feared the Benjamite 
tribe was finished. The other tribes had sworn not to give wives to 
any Benjamite yet they asked God to intervene on behalf of the 
Benjamites. "And the children of Israel repented them for Benjamin 
their brother, and said there is one tribe cut off from Israel this 
day." (12) The solution is strange to us but not to the Jews. One 
city had not sent any men to the assembly, and, because of this 
negligence, they were destroyed but their women (i.e. virgins) were 
captured and given to the Benjamites. (13) Each decision by the 
Israelites was sanctioned or commanded by Phineas the High Priest and 
keeper of the Ark. 
The Levite had a claim on the whole people for justice under the 
Torah. The whole tribe of Benjamin was punished for breaking the laws 
about murder. The whole tribe was punished (and almost destroyed) for 
the sins of a few. However, the tribe of Benjamin was considered 
essential as a part of the whole, a "brother" in the 'family' of 
Israel. Later on, Solomon sinned, so the Jewish nation was punished. 
Earlier, Moses had three thousand men killed because they worshiped a 
golden calf. (14) All the law and the customs of the Jews was 
designed, not for the people of Israel, but for the continuing 
relationship between the people and their God. The foundation of the 
law was the covenant and the will of God. (15) Anyone breaking the 
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laws of the covenant brought punishment on the whole of Israel. It is 
for this reason that the scapegoat was slain. The goat represented 
the tribe as a whole and Aaron had to confess over him "all the 
iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions in 
all their sins". (16) 
In the early history of Israel, therefore, the individual counted 
for little. He was a part of a nation 'family' belonging to a jealous 
God. To rebel in the family, was to deny the will of God and the 
punishment was death. In fact, for a child to rebel against his own 
parents was also seen in a similar light. The rebellious son is taken 
to the elders of the city and "all the men of his city shall stone him 
with stones, that he die." (17) However, the destruction and the 
dispersal of the Jewish nation brought about a change unique in its 
influence. 
In Jeremiah and Ezekiel, a new concept was emerging. God was no 
longer just the God of the nation as a whole, for the nation no longer 
existed as a unit, He became a God for the individual. From the 
externally oriented religion, Judaism now was oriented to the inner 
man. God was individualized. Daniel prayed to and fought for God 
alone. Aaron could not think of defying the people of Israel when 
they asked him to build a golden calf. Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego 
defied Nebuchadnezzar because of their faith. In Jeremiah, God had 
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proclaimed a new covenant would be made when He brought the Jews back 
to Israel: 
After these days, saith the Lord, I will put my law 
in their irovard parts, and write it in their 
hearts; and will be their God, and they shall be my 
people. And they shall teach no more every man his 
neighbour, and every man his brother, saying, Know 
the Lord: for they shall all know me, from the 
least of them unto the greatest of them (18) 
From now on, "everyone shall die for his own iniquity". (19) 
After the people returned, the new covenant was instituted. All souls 
are God's and every man is responsible for his own soul. (20) From 
now on, there was a direct link of each individual to his God, and of 
each person's responsibility for his soul to his own conscience. 
As a result of this new 'covenant', two sets of laws were set for 
each follower of God: the higher, moral law of God, and the lesser 
civil law of man. Daniel and his friends obeyed the higher laws of 
God rather than the laws of their earthly rulers. Whereas before the 
exile, prophets had always linked the law, even a written law, (21) to 
God as being expressions of His will, after the exile, Ezra uses the 
law to bring the people together and to take them out of 'bondage' and 
the people gave up their foreign wives and children, and their lands 
in order to obey the law and go to Israel once again. (22) "From being 
a nation tied to the law Israel becomes a religious community gathered 
around the law." (23) The loss of the ark and the temple did not 
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destroy the Jewish religion because of the new emphasis on the law for 
its own sake. God's direct contact with the nation of Israel declines 
after this point. This change is reflected in the use of the word for 
'law'. Earlier prophets used 'torah' not only for law but also for 
the divine word. It was a duty of the priests. It had divine 
authority, no matter the circumstances. Later on, others were 
involved in the law, such as scribes, yet the divine authority within 
the laws was still evident. (24) After the exile, the law becomes a 
more concrete concept. The law becomes more important than the temple 
and the scribes more important than the priests. (25) In fact, the 
Pharisees had come to believe that the law and the strict observance 
of the law was the only salvation for the believer. However, the same 
word is also used to describe the laws of other lands and even of 
military laws. It is Greek they used in Hellenic times and the word 
•vouos' is not a strict translation of 'torah'. New elements have 
been included in the concept. (26) 
The exile of the Jews in Babylon resulted in two radical changes 
in thought: God became individualized, and the law became a more 
substantive concept while being divided into the higher moral law of 
God and the lesser civil law of man. These changes are unique to the 
Jewish nation. 
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In China, one of the words for the 'state' is 'kuo-chia' which 
means 'state-family', and, as in a family, all the members, including 
the ruler, must work together. Within the state, the clans were of 
great importance. The clan was responsible for the behaviour of all 
its members, and whole families were fined or killed as punishment for 
the crime of one of its members. (28) In many ways, the ancient 
Chinese society of 500 B.C. was similar to the Jewish society at the 
same time. The individual thought of himself as a member of the 
family and not as an isolated entity. It was a crime for a son to set 
up his own household while his parents were living. Children were 
married according to their parents' wishes. No member of the 
household could be forced to testify against another member and any 
child that accused his parents should be put to death even if the 
accusation was proven to be true. Religious communities were also 
treated as families, so that a master and novice were treated as uncle 
and nephew. Each family was like a little kingdom. (29) 
The religious movements usually emphasized the individual. The 
Taoists were almost anarchical in their value on human freedom. No 
government had any rights over the individual for the Taoist, but then 
they did not set a high value on society and often chose to be 
recluses. (30) Confucius, on the other hand, said: 
It is not in the nature of man to find his social life 
among the beasts and birds. If we do not remain in the 
society of men, with whom else can ire associate 
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ourselves? Moreover, if the world were in good order, 
I should not be trying to change it. (31) 
Like Plato, he sought a prince who would put his ideas into 
practice but failed. The Buddhists reinforced the Taoists principles 
when they arrived in China. They declared that "monks owe no 
veneration to the king." (32) For all three religions, there was a 
sort of higher moral law to which the individual was responsible. 
However, there were exceptions. The legalists tended to ignore 
the individual because the state was all important. The end was the 
state and the people were merely means to that end. There was no 
power or law greater than that of the state. They denied family 
relationships because the individual belonged, and owed his loyalty, 
to the state. Lord Shang, one of the major founders of China as we 
know it today, was one of the major proponents. The Ch'in state, with 
such an ideology, was able to expand into an empire, the first in 
China (255-207 B.C.) (33) Later Confucianism was a wedding of the 
thought of Confucius and the thought of the Legalists. 
The old legal system was set up in the Han period (206-23 B.C.) 
and settled in the T'ant Dynasty (618-905 A.D.) and remained basically 
the same until the end of the nineteenth century. There was no civil 
law, as all law was penal and linked to ethical or moral law. Because 
of the link, the law was always sovereign and not the emperor. All 
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had to obey the law. This principle was set by the Emperor Wen 
(reigned 179-156 B.C.). (34) The family was rigidly reinforced by 
the law (as noted above) and the individual was denied any conceptual 
existence. The Chinese philosophy was one which viewed the 
well-integrated individual as one who thought of his duties and not of 
his rights. 
The Japanese had a similar cultural experience. The 'samurai' 
class were treated like a family and were called the 'children of the 
family', yet had a kind of lord/vassal contractual value. (35) The 
family "stood above the individual as the ethical reality. The 
individual was the secondary existence within the structure of the ie 
(family) to which he belonged." (36) India reflects the same 
principles with the addition of a caste system. (37) It, too, 
reflects a union of law with the divine. "The rajan, or prince, was 
an instrument of society, an upholder and protector of social law 
(dharma). But he had no authority either to make or to modify law, 
for 'dharma' was divine, ancient, revealed in words heard from God..." 
(38) 
In the oriental world, the law remained joined to the divine, and 
the religion remained an external concept, i.e. 'outer-directed' and 
not directed inwardly to the soul. Form, duties, rituals, etc. 
remained more important than individual conscience. The attempts by 
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early Taoism, Confucius, and early Buddhists to link the individual to 
the divine directly failed and one of the reasons is that the 'law' 
was not a distinct concept and was not conceptually separated into the 
divine and civil laws. 
In a monotheistic society like Judaism, it is hard to separate the 
church and the state as conceptual entities. In China and India, as 
well, the society was a means of enforcing the divine on earth. The 
early Jewish state was the same. The Egyptians found it impossible to 
conceptualize Egypt without the divine. Ancient Greece, however, was 
able to bifurcate the concepts. At first, the Greeks, like Homer, 
believed that the gods were involved in everything. By Plato's time, 
the two concepts were quite distinct. 
Thales, one of the earliest philosophers, was able to say "all 
things are full of gods" (39) Hesiod looked at the city, he saw that 
those who "do not step at all off the road of Tightness, their city 
flourishes" but "when men like harsh violence and cruel acts, Zeus ... 
ordains their punishment. Often a whole city is paid punishment for 
one bad man who commits crimes and plans reckless action." (40) For 
Hesiod, "Justice herself is a young maiden. She is Zeus's daughter" 
and "immortals are close to us, they mingle with men". (41) The state 
and the divine were conceptually indistinguishable. Even Solon 
thought of "Justice" in the same manner as Hesiod. (42) 
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Lycurgus, however, must have had a clearer conception of the state 
in mind when he set up the Spartan constitution. According to 
Xenophon, the two kings were considered to be of divine descent and as 
such performed religious duties on behalf of the state and led the 
armies. Items offered in sacrifice were often given to the kings. 
The kings were also the ones who consulted the gods on behalf of the 
state. The state, however, was run by a council called ephors. The 
ephors were chosen from all classes of the citizenry but had 
dictatorial powers. Only the ephors did not have to rise from their 
seats whenever a king was present. Every month, the ephors and the 
kings exchanged oaths, the ephors on behalf of the state, and the 
kings on their own behalf. The kings' oath was: "I will exercise my 
kingship in accordance with the established laws of the state" while 
the ephors swore: "so long as he (who exercises kingship) shall abide 
by his oath we will not suffer his kingdom to be shaken." (43) 
In Sparta, the concept of the state was distinct from the concept 
of the divine. By the beginning of the Hellenic period in Athens, the 
same distinction was part of Isocrates' view of his state. "The soul 
of a state is nothing else than its polity". (44) Even in Plato's 
time, the distinction was beginning to become clear. At the beginning 
of Plato's Republic, Socrates waited until Cephelus left to perform 
his religious duties as archon in order to examine the concepts of 
'justice' and 'good' and the 'state'. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle 
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believed that man was not self-sufficient so people associated in 
communities or in a polis. (45) Pindar believed that man has a 
temporary identity from god, but Plato details in the Laws how the 
individual derives his identity from society. In Plato's Greece, many 
children were given name endings that reflect public virtues or 
values, such as: 'agoras', 'the public speaker'; 'dikos' or 'dikaios', 
'justified, just, etc'; 'demos', 'having to do with people'. (46) The 
most important person was the one who could influence and lead others. 
That the concept of the state was perceived by the people of 
Hellenic Athens to be distinct from the divine can be concluded by 
looking at the literature of the time. However, the reasons for such 
a change are not grasped as easily. Leo Strauss believed that a new 
concept of nature had been 'discovered', and this 'discovery' was a 
necessary condition for the 'discovery' of natural rights. In Hebrew, 
there was no term for nature used in the Old Testament, so the concept 
of natural rights was missing completely. (47) Without natural 
rights, Strauss believed, the importance of the individual will be 
negligible. However, without 'nature' as another basis or explanatory 
foundation for the state, the divine was the only 'foundation' 
available. Thales had believed that the gods were in everything. 
Aristotle believed that it ivas in man's 'nature' to be social. He 
based his idea or justification for the 'polis' on the nature of man 
himself and not on a divine ordinance. Zeno, the founder of the Stoa, 
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wrote a book called On The Nature Of Man in which he stated that the 
end of life was to be in agreement with nature. (48) (The Stoics 
developed the concept of nature to such an extent that they introduced 
the concept of the 'original state of nature' which Hobbes and Locke 
used later on.) The end of life was 'to act with good reason in the 
selection of what is natural'. (49) The concept of man's nature \ms 
developed by Zeno to such an extent that, in his Republic, he 
described a Utopian state where there was no government, no law, no 
rules, but those of nature. Zeno's 'Republic' was an early 
anarchistic state. 
The Pythagoreans were also involved in an area of study other than 
the divine. However, their philosophical studies raised numbers into 
a religion. The Sophists of Socrates' time helped lay down the 
foundations for the concept of nature. Protagoras said that man is 
the measure of all things. The Sophists were convinced that a 
'rational theory of human nature' was the first principle of 
philosophy. Man was to be the centre of the universe. For the 
Sophists, man was an individual, (50) but it was still a vague 
non-universal concept. The Sophists influenced many schools but the 
dominant intellectual force of Greek thought that survived in western 
civilization, was that of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Despite 
their divergence in views, these three men sought absolute values in 
which man, individually or as a society, could find true meaning. 
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Eric Voegelin expressed this view saying that the new idea was one of 
"a man who has found his true nature through finding his true relation 
to God". (51) 
Nature, and human nature, had suddenly become legitimate, and, 
perhaps, the only legitimate, subject for study. The Babylonians had 
studied the stars and the Egyptians laid the foundations of math and 
engineering, but these were part of the divine. The Greeks studied 
the 'non-divine' for its own sake. It was during the study of man and 
his nature that there arose questions of how man could apprehend ideas 
such as 'justice', 'good', 'happiness', 'courage', etc. Plato, 
Aristotle and Zeno were led back to politics and the study of the 
polis. For Plato, the soul of the individual was tied to his social 
nature and they were inseparable. He devoted most of Book X of the 
Laws to the question of the soul. For Aristotle "the city-state is a 
perfectly natural form of association, as the earlier associations 
from which it sprang were natural." (52) 
A revolutionary change had occurred. The state, as a concept, iras 
perceived to be separate from the concept of the divine. A new 
foundation, nature, had been discovered to replace the old. The Jews 
were unable to think of themselves apart from God. The 'state' in 
Egypt was inconceivable apart from the divine. In Japan, the emperor 
was a descendent of the gods. In Chinese, the name for the emperor 
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ivas ' Son-of-Heaven'. Nature, for the Taoists and others, ivas to be 
studied because it was part of the 'divine', inescapably joined to the 
'divine'. For the Greeks, nature had its own foundations. Even the 
gods were subject to their own natures. According to the surviving 
Greek intellectual traditions, the state was founded on the 'nature of 
man', and not on the pleasure of the gods. 
The fourth and last change of the ancient world that we will be 
discussing was a meld of the two major traditions in Christendom: the 
Jewish and the Greek. Although Rome ruled at this time, it was the 
thought of Hellenic Palestine that dominates the New Testament and the 
thought of Christ. From the Hellenic, we have the individual and the 
state based on nature and justice on the stoic contract and agreement. 
The Jewish tradition presented the 'new covenant* and the importance 
of the law. As a result, Christ was able to say to a questioner: 
"Render, therefore, unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and 
unto God the things which are God's." (53) 
Christ's message, at that time, was directed at the individual. 
Sayings such as "For what is a man profited, if he shall gain the 
whole world, and lose his own soul? or what shall a man give in 
exchange for his soul?" (54) and "He that believeth on me hath 
everlasting life" (55) are common in the books of the Apostles. Any 
Concordance will show that "faith" is a common xrord in the New 
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Testament but almost missing in the Old. However, once the believer 
joins the Followers of Christ, he becomes part of a family or a whole. 
Paul uses words such as "philo-storgos" (56) in Romans 12:10: "Be 
kindly affectioned one to another with brotherly love". The 
translation 'kindly affectioned' misses the tone of the original 
Greek. 'Storge' meant 'love' as in 'family affection'. The Christian 
community was considered to be a family and not a society. Christians 
could become the 'sons of God' (John 1:12), 'heirs of God, and 
joint-heirs with Christ' (Romans 8:17), "so we, being many, are one 
body in Christ" (Romans 12:5). In the Middle Ages, such concepts were 
picked up by most of the intellects of the age. The message was 
individual in nature, yet once it had been acted upon, the individual 
lost his individuality and became part of something else larger than 
himself, something more than a community or a society. 
Other areas of the Roman world were also beginning to recognize 
the individual as a distinct concept. Following the Stoic trend of 
thought, Cicero and Seneca often used the word 'individuum', meaning 
'that which cannot be cut or divided', and later, 'a unique thing'. 
(57) Yet, both were passionately involved in the state. Cicero, in 
particular, devoted his whole life to politics and to a concept of the 
state, the values of which were the old Republican values of selfless 
devotion to the state. Cicero tried to base his justification of the 
state on reason and nature, individual values: 
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Therefore, since there is nothing better than 
reason, and since it exists both in man and in god, 
the first community of man and god is a society of 
reason. But those who have reason in common must 
also have right reason in common, and since right 
reason is law, we must believe that men are 
associated also with the gods in law Hence we 
must now conceive this whole universe as one 
commonwealth of gods and men. (58) 
Another Stoic, Marcus Aurelius, believed that "judgement is the 
central power in man, the common source of truth and morality." (59) 
The individual was not yet an 'autonomous', 'unique', or 
'distinct' concept, and the state was still more, or as, important, 
yet the concept of the individual, as an important part of the human 
makeup, had arrived. Where the ancient Greeks had no equivalent to 
our concept 'person', but an extensive vocabulary for expressing 
'community being', the later classical period was able to place more 
emphasis on the individual apart from the state. 
The ancient world presented us with many principles which we still 
hold as fundamental to our set of beliefs. As far as the concept of 
the individual is concerned, four of those principles are unique to 
western culture. As we have seen, the Jewish nation was able to 
'individualize God' so that the individual was responsible for his own 
soul and conscience. The second change was the separation of the 
concept of law 'based on the divine' and law 'based on man' or civil 
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law. Law, for the Jews, had become a concept independent of God, yet 
based on his moral law. This concept of law was reinforced by the 
Greek concept of law which had also originally connected law to the 
divine but later was in contrast to the divine. (60) The Greeks were 
able to add an additional change - the separation of the concepts of 
the 'state' and the divine'. A new foundation of the state was found 
in 'nature'. Taken to an extreme, the Stoics were able to 
conceptualize man without a government in the 'state of nature'. The 
general intellectual trend of the classical period, however, was to 
maintain the importance of the state but with an added emphasis on the 
individual. These changes in thought were to have profound influence 
on the Middle Ages, and on the modern world. 
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The Middle Ages. 
The Middle Ages (61) were noted for the breakdown of 
'civilization', i.e. the intellectual tradition, for the dominance of 
the Catholic Church and the revival of the organic traditions, and the 
revival of tribal and the introduction of feudal traditions. In the 
intellectual realm, the writings of St. Augustine, Cicero and Seneca 
dominated entirely for almost eight hundred years. Only the Bible was 
more sacrosanct in the minds of the academia. 
Inheriting, as it did, the parallel concepts of the church and 
state from the classical age, the Middle Ages are a history of the 
struggle between the two for temporal sovereignty. The upper hand was 
with the church in the beginning, but in the end the church was 
defeated, and it became a national institution. At the same time, the 
state developed a new justification for its existence, and that 
foundation was its own citizenry. The development of the individual 
into a citizen was a slowly developed and vague legacy of the Middle 
Ages. As a "foundation", nature has been shifted from the state to 
the individual. The Middle Ages (and the Renaissance which I include 
in the general term "Middle Ages") arrived at a conceptual level in 
ivhich reason, judgement and the soul were the part of man's nature 
which induced him to live communally. The state was the result of 
man's nature and was not necessarily "natural" itself in that it had 
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its own nature. A fourth legacy of the Middle Ages was our perception 
of time. St. Augustine's authority eliminated the cyclical conception 
of time. Time was now linear and it had a purpose. It was linear 
because a cyclical time concept would involve taking a happy soul with 
God and returning him to the earth to be saved all over again. It had 
a purpose, ivhich was to reach the City of God. (62) 
More than anyone else, St. Augustine represented the union of the 
Greco- Roman and the Judeo-Christian traditions of thought. He had 
studied with Plotinus and his mystical Neo-Platonism, and he applied 
the principles of Plato to the teachings of Christ. Plato's ideas 
became the transcendent qualities of God. The separation of the 
divine and civil laws became "The City of God" and the "City of Man". 
The two were no longer reconcileable and man must endure the City of 
Man in order to reach the City of God. However, the only way to find 
the way to the City of God was through the revelation by God, and only 
the knowledge of God was important. "God and the soul, that is what I 
desire to know. Nothing else? Absolutely nothing." (63) The 
separation of the "City of God" and the "City of Man" was a principle 
in many areas of the classical christian church. Hosius, 
Constantine's adviser, admonished the Emperor Constantius during the 
Arian-Athanasius struggle: 
63 
Remember that you are but mortal; and be fearful of 
the day of judgement and keep yourself pure with 
that day in view. Do not interfere in matters 
ecclesiastical but learn about them from us. 
For into your hands God has put the Kingdom; the 
affairs of his Church he has committed to us. If 
any man stole the Empire from you,he would be 
resisting the ordinances of God... We are not 
permitted to exercise an earthly rule; and you, 
Sire, are not authorized to burn incense. (64) 
Hosius was insistent on the separation of church and state in 
practical terms before St. Augustine was born. Taking his cue from 
St. Paul (65), Hosius believed that either God allowed, or gave, the 
kingdom to be ruled by its ruler. To disobey the ruler was to disobey 
God. However, the ruler himself was not allowed to break God's laws. 
This was to be a major contentious issue at the height of the Middle 
Ages. One of the great battles that the Middle Ages is noted for, 
then, is the battle between the state and the church, a battle which 
ended in the defeat of the church. 
The height of the battle occurred between Gregory VII and Henry 
IV. Gregory claimed complete sovereignty for the church: 
Especially to me, as thy representative, has been 
committed, and to me by thy grace has been given by 
God the power of binding and loosing in heaven on 
earth. Relying, then, on this belief... I 
withdraw the government of the whole kingdom of the 
Germans and of Italy from Henry the King... For he 
has risen up against thy Church with unheard of 
arrogance. (66) 
Later on he added: 
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Shall not an authority founded by laymen - even by 
those who do not know God, - be subject to that 
authority which the providence of God Almighty has 
for His own honour established and in his mercy 
given to the world?... Who can doubt but that the 
priests of Christ are to be considered the fathers 
and masters of kings and princes and of all the 
faithful? Is it not clearly pitiful madness for a 
son to attempt to subject to himself his Father, a 
pupil his master (67) 
Gregory used the concept of the family as well as moral arguments 
to back his claim. Christendom was considered by many to be the 
'Family of God' and the church as the 'body of Christ'. In opposition 
to Gregory's claims, Henry tried to link his rule directly to God. He 
wrote to Gregory: 
Henry, king not through usurption but through the 
holy ordination of God.... thou, however, hast 
understood our humility to be free, and hast not, 
accordingly, shunned to rise up against the royal 
power conferred upon us by God, daring to threaten 
to divest us of it. As if we had received our 
kingdom from thee! As if the kingdom and the 
empire were in thine and not in God's hands! (68) 
There is a sense that the king is a steward or a guardian whom God has 
placed in charge directly. However, in neither case do the combatants 
think of or consider the ordinary person. Only the pope, the king and 
God are important and everything else was to be disposed of by God and 
his representatives on earth. 
The attitudes of these two offices and the men who occupied them 
gained adherants in the intellectual life on both sides. In the end, 
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of course the authority of the kings won out and the church was seldom 
able to exercise authority over a state again. However, although much 
of the literature that survives is concerned with the church/state 
conflict, other political and social trends, which concern the concept 
of the individual were growing. 
Walter Ullman's magnificent book: The Individual and Society in 
the Middle Ages (69) has helped to refocus medieval studies in 
fundamental ways. He feels that medieval students did not distinguish 
between the individual as a subject and the individual as a citizen. 
(70) He adds: 
In a rough sense one may well say that for the 
larger part of the Middle Ages it was the 
individual as a subject that dominated the scene, 
while in the later Middle Ages and in the modern 
period the subject was gradually supplanted by the 
citizen. (71) 
Ullman claimed that from Rome, the Middle Ages inherited the 
concept of society as a corporation, and when this idea was added to 
ecclesiastical thinking, the Christian had become a member of an 
"all-embracing, comprehensive corporation, the church... a full member 
of the 'corpus Christi' was effected by his baptism." (72) This idea 
is not unique to Ullman, as Colin Morris also says: "The church is the 
body of Christ, each member a limb in it. All believers share in the 
one Spirit, all are stones in the living Temple." (73) What Ullman 
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does add to medieval studies is the emphasis on the individual that he 
perceived stemming both from Feudalism and from the church. 
First, he gives what most medievalists have perceived before, that 
people were called the 'corpus Christi', the faithful, the church, the 
congregation- all words depicting unity, a oneness which denied the 
autonomy of the individual. "The individual's standing within society 
was based upon his office or his official function." (74) Their 
status, their identity depended on the grace of the king and without 
it they had no place in society. Henry IV had written to Gregory as 
if God had entrusted him directly with His people. Ullman presents 
the concept of the munt (75) of the king. He claims that this concept 
was crucial to all medieval kingdoms. The 'munt' was similar to a 
'guardianship' over a minor. In Anglo-Saxon England, the 'munt' of a 
bride was transferred from the parents to the bridgegroom. The 
kingdom was considered to be entrusted into the hands of the king itfho 
was to protect and guide his subjects. The medieval jury was required 
to give unanimous decisions on certain occasions, and they were 
certainly functioning, not as themselves, but as spokesmen for the 
country. (76) Interdicts and Depositions give indications of the 
collective punishments common at the time. Other personal clues also 
point to the lack of individual identity: anonymity of writers, 
architects, etc., and the lack of individuality in hand writing. (77) 
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The attacks on heresy were important because faith, and the 
individual's obedience to it, were the bonds that held society 
together, so that an attack on the faith was an act of treason. (78) 
The Jewish respect for the law continued at this time: 
...All the individual bodies may and will die, but 
what cannot die is the idea of law, the idea of 
right order, which holds the public and corporate 
body together and which, therefore, possessed 
sempiternity. (79) 
Ullman's perception of an organic, corporate whole that was the 
society of medieval ages is supported by other scholars. The origin 
of the organic state has its source in the thought of Cicero according 
to some scholars. (80) Another states: "Medieval political thought 
was a stable compound of both organic and individualistic theory." 
(81) Everything that Ullman mentioned above is supported by other 
scholars with slight variations. 
As for individualism, Ullman sees the source of our modern concept 
in the law, in feudalism, and in the advent of the study of Aristotle. 
Tliere were two systems of law: customary or unwritten law, which had 
to have some participation by the people; and the written law from 
superior sources which contained the duty to obey. These systems were 
often in conflict. The code of Justinian contained a law by 
Constantine the Great that no customary law could abrogate any 
imperial or enacted law. (82) 
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Personal relationships and oaths of fealty were often cemented by 
holy relics: a piece of the true cross or the bones of a saint. When 
a man gave his oath, his whole relationship with God was also 
involved. The wealthy and the powerful soon found it relatively 
simple, later on, to find a priest who would absolve them of their 
obligation on condition that they would pay a penance (usually to the 
church and the priest) for their sin of breaking their oath or word. 
Common law was often based on the customs built up by the original 
reverence paid to oaths. Part of the unwritten or common law was the 
laws or principles of feudalism. The oath of fealty was a personal, 
religious relationship as well as a legal one. The contract could be 
repudiated if either side did not fulfill the obligations. (83) The 
feudal tendency was to reduce all social and political organizations 
"to a network of contractual bonds between pairs of individuals." (84) 
"The bonds of society were personal and tribal, and the idea of public 
authority progressively disappeared, to such an extent that early 
medieval Europe had no word corresponding to the respublica of the 
Roman world or the in the modern age." (85) 
There are many examples to support this thesis: 
I, Richard Altemir... swear that from this hour 
forward I xrill be faithful to you, the lord Count 
Raymond... (and he goes on to mention places and 
lands he pledges to leave to his lord)... But I 
shall give to you as many times as you ask it of 
me, personally or through your messengers... 
without deceiving you... (86) 
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Gadbert of Burges (1127) describes the earliest description of an act 
of homage during the granting of a fief: 
The count asked each one if he wished to become 
wholly his man, and the latter replied, "I so 
wish", and tri.th his his hands clasped and enclosed 
by those of the count, they were bound together by 
a kiss. Secondly, he who had done homage pledged 
his faith to the count's spokesman in these xvords: 
"I promise on my faith that I will henceforth be 
faithful to Count William and that I will maintain 
my homage toward him completely against everyone, 
in good faith and without guile.(87) 
One result or culmination of the individualizing process of 
feudalism was the thirty-ninth Article of the Magna Carta: 
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or 
disseized, or outlaxved, or exiled, or in any way 
harmed - nor will we go upon or send upon him -
save by the laxvful judgement of his peers or by the 
law of the land. (88) 
This article is the legal keystone in individualism in the English 
world. No longer did the king have the right to rule according to his 
own will. The barons revolted because the king had set aside common 
law that had arisen from feudal sources. Common law rapidly grexv in 
influence. Edward Ill's coronation medal in 1327 had inscribed "the 
will of the people gives law" and in the 1300's Chief Justice Thorpe 
said that parliament represented the 'body of all the realm' and "the 
law of the land is made in parliament by the king and the spiritual 
and temporal lords and the whole community of the realm." (89) 
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John's grandson, Edward I, accepted the reality of participation 
by the people in ruling the country. In his "Writ of Summons of 
Representatives of the Countries and Boroughs to Parliament", he says 
he "intends to have a consultation and meeting with the earls, barons 
and other principal men of our kingdom", and, more importantly, that 
these representatives "are to have full and sufficient power for 
themselves and for the community of the aforesaid country... then and 
there for doing what shall then be ordained according to the common 
counsel in the premises..." (90) The people of England xvere not only 
to be consulted, but also were to have power to implement their 
decisions. 
The 'power of the people' was to be used by Richard II, almost one 
hundred years later, to end direct papal influence in Britain. 
National church offices were to be filled by free elections, national 
church money xvas to remain in the country, and so on, and all on the 
authority of "Our lord the King... with the assent of all the great 
men and the commons of the said realm." (91) Philip IV of France 
already had destroyed the authority of the papacy in that country, so 
now the only major country left where papal authority still held sway 
xras the weakened Holy Roman Empire. Without a strong civil authority 
in Germany, that country had to wait until the advent of the 
Reformation to finish the authority of the church. Not only had the 
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church and the state separated conceptually and practically but the 
state had superceded the church so that the latter was now subject to 
the former, instead of the other way around. Noxv national authority 
xras greater than papal authority and only the conscience of the 
individual was left for 'divine' influence. 
A new awareness of the individual was growing in western 
civilization,d Art started to show individuals as opposed to idealized 
types. (92) A nexv distinction was made betxveen the individual as a 
person and as a citizen. The first translator of Aristotle's works, 
William of Moerbeke, had to coin a new xrord, politizare, a verb, to 
mean 'an individual in his capacity as a citizen', in order to 
translate the original Greek. (93) Intellectual life in the Middle 
Ages is usually seen to be heavily oriented tox^ ard theological issues 
and axiray from the concerns of the ordinary individual. The 
organicism, corporativeness of the Christian society was perceived to 
be the only description of society possible. In addition, the 
intellectual life was seen to be without substantive conflict. In 
reality, however, the intellectual life was one of turmoil and 
conflict. Four streams of classical thought continued into the Middle 
Ages: Stoicism and Epicureanism; Old Testament thought; Platonism; 
and Aristotelianism. Each had its oxvn perspective of the individual. 
Only Averroism fought against the individualizing process that xras 
building in the Middle Ages. 
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One of the most potent conflicts revolved around the question of 
whether faith alone was the only foundation of knowledge. The Stoic 
and Aristotelian tradition emphasized reason as being a source of 
knowledge and that reason was, by nature, a part of man. (94) 
Marsilius of Padua looked to reason to discover knowledge: 
I shall divide my proposed work into three 
discourses. In the first I shall demonstrate my 
viextfs by sure methods discovered by the human 
intellect, based upon propositions self-evident to 
every mind not corrupted by nature, custom, or 
perverted emotion. In the second discourse, the 
things which I shall believe myself to have 
demonstrated I shall confirm by established 
testimonies of the eternal truth.... (95) 
Marsilius carried his belief in reason to the Bible itself. For 
him the individual must be free to interpret the Bible for himself. 
To accept the authority of the priests without question was 
unnecessary, because the individual could draw his own conclusions. 
"And it is indeed remarkable if we are obliged to believe the 
authority of the glossators rather than Christ, whoever be that 
glossator, even a saint, and especially since he makes this assertion 
not as glossator but on his own understanding." (96) Considering the 
fact that Marsilius xvas forced to flee the papacy to the court of 
Ludwig of Bavaria in Nuremberg after he had finished the book in 1324, 
it is an interesting coincidence that Luther should arrive at a 
similar, if more pronounced, conclusion almost two hundred years 
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later. 
Aquinas also believes in the use of reason. For him law and 
justice involve the reason of man. "Therefore all laws, in so far as 
they partake of right reason, are derived from the external law." (97) 
William of Ockham went even further and adopted the 'original state of 
nature' concept of the stoics, where the earth belonged to all in 
common and all men xvere free, and claimed that 'natural rights' could 
not be put aside by positive law, and reason was the instrument used 
to ensure that natural laxv and justice were the foundations of any 
community. (99) This did not mean that Ockham did not see his xvorld as 
a corporate society (99), but that that corporation was founded on 
man's own nature. Marsilius also saw his society as a natural 
phenomenon (100) but, again it xvas based on reason and man's nature. 
He also added that the state made its oxvn laws, and they were made by 
or xvith the consent of its citizenry. Non-human laxvs could not be 
called laws properly because they lacked an element of consent (101): 
The authority to make the laws belongs... to the 
whole body of citizens or to the weightier part 
thereof... (102) 
An opposition to reason as a source of knowledge was formidable. 
Petrus Damiani, Bernard of Clairvaux (103) and the papacy itself were 
determined that faith was to be the sole source of knowledge. A major 
thinker in Medieval Political thought, John of Salisbury, also placed 
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the foundation of the state on the 'divine', but he supported the 
kings, against the papacy. As Henry IV had declared himself to be 
directly appointed by God, so did John believe. He had no clear 
conception of the difference between the individual as person and as 
citizen. Hoxvever, he did x\rant to return to a 'state of nature' 
without kings and kingdoms but living in peace, but it xvas a 'state of 
nature' before the fall of man and sin necessitated rulers. The 
'commonxvealth' can only flourish "when the higher members shield the 
lower, and the lower respond faithfully and fully in like measure to 
the just demands of their superiors, so that each and all are as it 
xvere members one of another by a sort of reciprocity." (104) Because 
the ruler was appointed to rule by God, he could see no xvay in xvhich a 
tyrant could be removed from office. To kill a king was to break your 
oath of fealty. (105) Yet, even he has a sense of the individual: 
Liberty means judging everything freely in 
accordance with one's individual judgement, and 
does not hesitate to reprove what it sees opposed 
to good morals. (106) 
John's individual judgement was based on the believer's participation 
in a higher moral law. The individual was obligated to oxve obedience 
to the higher laws before the positive laws of man. 
John of Salisbury, hoxvever, lived long before John, the king of 
England. Medieval thought had changed considerably, as I have pointed 
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out. John's 'individual judgement' became a right to participate in 
the 'justice' of the state by participating in making and applying the 
laxvs themselves. By the early 1300's, Durandus de San Porciano, a 
jurist, declared that secular power had jurisdiction over men as 
citizens because there was secular legitimate power in non-Christian 
countries. (107) Even Peter Abelard, who was an older contemporary of 
John of Salisbury, had a more modern viewpoint of man: "Although 
people say that Socrates and Plato are one in their humanity, how can 
that be accepted, when it is obvious that all men are different from 
each other both in matter and in form." (108) Albert the Great made it 
clear that to rely on revelation for explanations of natural phenomena 
would be absurd. For him, experience was the only guide. (109) His 
pupil, Aquinas, believed the reason and revelation were two different 
expressions of the same truth. "The divine right does not abrogate 
the human right which originates in reason." (110) 
By the sixteenth century, the struggles of the Middle Ages had 
resolved themselves. Having inherited the concepts of divine, or 
higher, and positive, or lower, laws, the medieval man had raised the 
positive laxvs to be equal to the higher laws and to have its own 
justification, inception and enactment - the citizens of the state. 
The battle for ultimate sovereignty between the church and the state 
ended in a rout of the church, particularly in the Avignon period. 
The church became a national institution subject, as an institution, 
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to the state. Emerging with powers to enact legislation, the commons 
became a self-sufficient justification for the state. 
In the battle between the state and the papacy, the struggle over 
the conscience of the individual was the keenest. As a result, nexv 
ideas about individual judgement and the non-reliance on authority 
were introduced. Reason became as important as faith, and reason had 
its oxvn judgement. Using the stoic concept of nature and Aristotle's 
declaration that man was by nature a social being, medieval thought 
had found the link between 'nature' and 'reason' sufficient 
justification for the individual to use his own judgement on social, 
political and theological questions. God had become further 
'individualized'. Justus Lipsius, a stoicist, was able to believe 
that it was necessary not to oppose the universal laws of human 
nature, but, while maintaining those, man had to follow his oxvn 
particular nature, and the only way to understand this relatinship xvas 
through reason. (Ill) 
Man, no longer an object of misery and wretchedness, had become 
"the most fortunate of creatures and consequently worthy of all 
admiration... to be envied... even by the stars and by minds beyond 
this world." (112) Another writer says, in a fable, that man mimics 
the gods and they marvel so at man that he is invited to join them and 
to be one of them. (113) Nicholas Cusanus believed that 
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participation in the divine meant that every spiritual being must have 
its centre xvithin itself. (114) In order to attack and defeat 
Averroism, dominant in Italian Universities in the 14th, 15th and into 
the 16th century, other schools had to emphasize the self, the 
individual. Eventually, the idea that man xvas a spiritual individual, 
and that he recognized himself as such, prevailed. (115) A nexv 
concept had been introduced. The ideal of man included 'autonomy', 
but it xvas one that xvas intimately linked to the divine. Man's 
autonomy was related to his conscience, his soul, the religious centre 
of his being. 
The emphasis of my argument has been on the concept of 
'individualism', and as such it has emphasized those areas indicating 
its presence and growth. The concept was by no means clear to those 
of the late 15th and early sixteenth century, or even later. Sir 
Thomas Elyot, in his The Book Named the Governor, (116) viewed society 
as an organism: 
A public xveal is a body living, compact or made of 
sundry estates and degrees of men, which is 
disposed by the order of equity and governed by the 
rule and moderation of reason. (117) 
Order is found in society as it is in all things because God has 
willed it so. Without order, there would be perpetual conflict and 
society would be destroyed resulting in the perishing of the 
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individual. Order reflects the diversity in intellectual gifts given 
by God. Those with greater gifts of understanding, aid those xvith 
lessor gifts by "detaining of other within the sounds of reason" and 
to guide them. Understanding and reason provide the means to 'virtue 
and commodious living' when shown to 'others of inferior 
understanding' 'through the glass of authority.' (118) 
Another Englishman also viewed society in a medieval sense, yet 
wrote his paper in 1606. (119) 
Plato imagined man to be an heavenlie plant; his 
head to be the roote; his bulke, the stocke; his 
armes and leggs the branches; and his root to draw 
his sapp from the heavens to Feede therewith the 
under parts, spreading downeward towardes the 
earth. Such a plantation do I conceive in the 
institution of a State politique: the sovereigne 
head to be designed, inspired, depending, and 
protected from above, and the body with the 
out-growing parts thereof, to receive nourishment, 
strength, flourishing, and fruitfulness from that 
root of a rightful regiment. (120) 
He does add provisos: 
These good duties of kindly subjection to kingly 
power, I leave to the consideration and conscience 
of every true subject... (121) 
And: 
In man the soule ruleth by reason, and in the state 
the soveraigne governeth by laxves (122) 
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Both men relied on reason as one foundation of the state; and upon 
reason was founded the laws of the state. Hoxvever, it was God's 
ordinance that there be a ruler and the ruled a natural order. Reason 
was to be used to perceive His ordinances. 
The most important writer of the age was Niccolo Machiavelli. 
Many books on political philosophy start with Machiavelli because they 
consider him to be the beginning of the modern age. John Plamenatz's 
work is titled: Man and Society A Critical Examination of Some 
Important Social And Political Theories From Machiavelli to Marx: 
(123) 
... it is with Machiavelli that modern social and 
political theory really begins. Indeed, he is 
often more modern in outlook, more theological, 
less a priori, and more down-to-earth than many of 
the great men who came after him. (124) 
However, Plamenatz points out a 'great omission' of Machiavelli's: 
"he was not interested in representative government" and he paid scant 
attention to the question of freedom. (125) 
That Machiavelli should be anti-theological ought to be no 
surprise considering the Averroist dominance of the Italian 
universities at that time. Averroes had proclaimed reason superior to 
revelation, even if it was a single active intellect for all mankind. 
(126) 'Political Averroism' had a number of emphases that are found in 
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Machiavelli: 
Skepticism about the ability of faith and religion 
to correspond to the demands and results of 
rational inquiry; veneration for Aristotle and 
denigration of traditional religious authorities; 
religious indifferentism; secularism and 
anti-clericalism; and determinism. (127) 
The Averroists also made a sharp distinction betxveen the masses and 
the fexv that can understand knowledge. Throughout The Prince, 
Machiavelli pays little attention to the masses except as subjects. 
(128) They can be ruled by arms, (129) and money (130) but they 
usually respond to a ruler who does not oppress them: "you can satisfy 
the people, because, for their object is more righteous than that of 
the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress, xvhilst the former only 
desire not to be oppressed." (131) Machiavelli was more interested in 
the structure of the state and the power of the state than he was in 
the moral ends of the state. (132) The state "contains xvithin 
itself... all the authority there is whithin the territory it 
embraces" and "nothing is superior to it." (133) Justice was what 
worked. "Hence, it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his oxvn 
to know how to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to 
necessity." (134) He goes on to add that he will be speaking of 
reality not some imaginary things about rulers. 
While The Prince xvas widely read and widely condemned, another 
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book, xvritten txvo years later, became almost as widely read: Sir 
Thomas More's Utopia. (135) More, hoxvever, was more inclined to 
think of the people and to trust them. Machiavelli found people 
'variable' and, while easy to persuade, hard to 'fix them in a 
persuasion'. (136) More described the people as having notions about 
their society and values, partly by customs and habits and partly by 
education. All the inhabitants read and study and xvere not fooled by 
"chimeras and fantastical images made in the mind" (137): 
None of them could comprehend what xve meant when xve 
talked to them of a man in the abstract as common 
to all men in particular, (so that though we spoke 
of him as a thing that xve could point at with our 
fingers, yet none of them could perceive him,) and 
yet distinct from every one, as if he xvere some 
monstrous colossus or giant. (138) 
More was evidently attacking the common belief that mankind was not 
made up of individuals. For him, people should learn, study and use 
their oxvn judgement. Everyone should have a right to everything 
belonging to the state, so "no private man can xvant anything". (139) 
His focus of study xvas on man, autonomous man, man as an individual 
governed by his oxvn reason. That he had to fight for the concept 
indicates that it xvas not the common viexvpoint of his age, but it xvas 
a concept xvithin the human perception of his age so that others could 
understand. 
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The Reformation and Social Contract 
Werner Stark has written that xvhereas Catholicism: 
is an incarnation of the principle... called 
community: the whole is before the parts. 
Calvinism, on the other hand, is a product of the 
principle of Association: the parts are before the 
whole. Catholicism thinks in terms of organic 
unity; it is collectivistic. Calvinism for its 
part thinks in terms of contractualism; it is 
individualistic. (140) 
Max Weber came to a similar conclusion in his The Protestant Ethic. 
(141) Religious individualism had arrived triumphant in the 
Reformation. No longer was there to be any intermediaries betxveen the 
believer and his God. The responsibility for his soul xvas his alone 
and he was to 'come' to God in his way. The covenant, mentioned in 
Ezekiel, xvas the new spiritual contract. 
Although others had thought of similar ideas before, this xvas the 
first time xvhen masses of people believed it. The printing press 
brought literature to the masses, and Reinhold Niebuhr called it the 
"predemocratic triumph of the xvritten language over more parochial 
loyalties of the tribe and dialect." (142) Education of the masses 
was another cause of the spread of such a nexv concept. Luther and 
Calvin both advocated and worked hard for mass education. The 
individual had to understand and knoxv what the Bible said in order to 
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interpret it for himself and find salvation through his faith alone. 
The individualistic, atomistic potential in religion erupted and 
destroyed the collectivist or organic idea of the church or the 
'universalis fidelis' into a collection of Christians - a Fellowship 
of believers. People became part of the physical or mechanical order, 
having as much in common as a rock collection or potted plants. 
It is at this point in the history of 'individualism' that we must 
reduce our area of study further. Of western society, those countries 
noted for their Catholic heritage must be left aside. The 
counter-revolution retained the organic overtones that are implicit in 
the Catholic churches of Spain, Portugal, Italy and so on, xvhile the 
Orthodox church was resistant to individualism. Only parts of 
northern Europe adopted the new concepts and it is from these 
countries that almost all our political thought originates. Denmark 
produced Soren Kierkegaard who wrote 'if I were to desire an 
inscription for my toombstone, I should desire none other than "That 
Individual" '.(143) England produced Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Bentham, 
Mill, Ayer and so on. Germany presented the world a schizophrenic 
viewpoint with Prussia on one side and Kant, Luther, Stirner and 
Burckhardt on the other. France, too, was split in its allegiance to 
various concepts. Bodin, Rousseau and Saint-Simon were opposed to de 
Bonald, de Maistre and Balzac. 
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Nexv concepts of man needed new concepts of the state and new 
justification for the state structure. Whereas the Middle Ages had 
looked upon society as a body, or a xvhole unit, the nexv concept saw 
society as an assembly of units, and the king xvas no longer the head 
of the societal body but something else - a unit or a man who rules 
other units or men. Calvin and Luther quoted St. Paul in Romans and 
believed the ruler xvas appointed by God and ought to be obeyed. 
Others felt that since each Christian was ruled by the Holy Spirit no 
one needs another temporal ruler. The justification for a society, 
and its source of justice, was the social contract, a concept that 
ruled Protestant influenced areas from 1600 to 1800. 
The key to the new age belongs to Martin Luther when he said: 
...we are all priests... and have all one faith, 
one Gospel, one Sacrament; how then should we not 
have the power of discerning and judging what is 
right or wrong in matters of faith? U44) 
In another tract he added two propositions: 
A Christian is a perfectly free lord of all, 
subject to none. A Christian is a perfectly 
dutiful servant of all, subject to all. (145) 
Luther himself did not realize what he was unleashing on the xvorld. 
Others forgot the second proposition rapidly and talked only of the 
'perfectly free lord of all'. It xvas the triumph of Autonomy. 
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John Calvin's doctrines took the concepts further than Luther 
would have wished: 
Now, since the consciences of believers, being 
privileged xvith liberty..., have been delivered by 
the favour of Christ from all necessary obligations 
to the observance of those things in which the Lord 
has been pleased they should be left free, xve 
conclude that they are exempt from all human 
authority... (146) 
Calvin wished to 'lock' the 'pre-elected' believer into the plan of 
God. Although he was not as subtle a thinker as Luther, his influence 
was as great, if not greater. Three major forces in Europe: Hugenot 
in France, Presbyterian in Scotland, and Puritan in England were 
deeply influenced by Calvin. Eventually the tone of absolute freedom 
to his arguments was carried to the new world, and his plan to chain 
the individual to God's plan dissipated in a nexv anti-religious xvorld. 
In England, it xvas the state that changed churches in the 
beginning, but soon the Puritans became most influential. In the end 
they were strong enough to enable Parliament to defeat, try, convict 
and destroy a king. Although a supporter of the king, the first great 
thinker to recognize the new political concepts, Thomas Hobbes, found 
any religious reason or justification for the state inadequate. Both 
the Stuarts and the Puritans founded their theories on God's will. 
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Hoxvever, a nexv era in science had arrived, and the startling 
results in science had a profound affect on political attitudes. The 
grandest scientific design attempted in England was by Francis Bacon. 
He xvanted to supplant all previous philosopies by a new philosophy 
founded on rigorous scientific observations: 
There was but one course left, therefore - to try 
the whole thing anew upon a better plan, and to 
commence a total reconstruction of sciences, arts, 
and all human knowledge, raised upon the proper 
foundations. (147) 
He wanted to: 
...establish forever a true and lawful marriage 
betxveen the empirical and the rational faculty, the 
unkind and ill-starred divorce and separation of 
xvhich has thrown into confusion all the affairs of 
the human family. (148) 
Hobbes xvas a philosopher long before he turned his thoughts on 
political theory and he was deeply impressed by the scientific 
advances of his age. With a background in science and philosophy, and 
influenced by both Bacon and Rene Descartes, he examined political 
thought and found it based on authoritative sources and not on 
empirical evidence. He decided to use scientific principles to 
examine the political spectrum. 
In De Cive, Hobbes tells his readers that he xvishes to describe 
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men "first as men; then as subjects, lastly, as Christians." (149) He 
does describe men as "made fit for society not by nature, but by 
education" and that although man may be born to desire society, he 
may not be born fit for it. (150) This is a grand break from the 
previously accepted doctrine by Aristotle. 'Natural' man is moved to 
society by the "mutual fear they had of each other". In the state of 
nature every man has a right to all, and because there are no laws in 
nature to break, everything is permissable. (151) Man, then, is 
driven by fear to make an agreement in which he trades many of his 
rights for security. It is in forming this agreement or contract that 
man creates the bonds of society. Breaking trust with the agreement 
is the source of injustice. (152) He also specifically points out 
that society i.e. the contract, is founded on reason and not on the 
nature of man. (153) 
Man as man is a collection of individuals with little or no social 
or organic contact between them, driven by self-regard and natural 
desires. Reason rescues man and, seeking security above everything 
else, trades the natural rights for secure and well defined civil 
rights. The resulting contract supercedes the natural laws or the 
laws of God. Natural and moral laws are one but they are of no 
account except where the conscience is concerned. When positive and 
moral laxv conflict, then externally it is the positive law that must 
hold sway. (154) The contract, law and the Leviathan are all the 
result of man's reason, and they are artificial creations: 
88 
With Hobbes the power of Christian tradition is for 
the first time fully broken by a clear-headed and 
cold-hearted rationalism. (155) 
All temporal authority, and perhaps not only human authority, 
springs from the consent of the people subject to it, yet Hobbes was 
reluctant to permit the people to overthrow a tyrant. John Locke xvas 
not as reluctant. Rejecting the 'short nasty and brutish' aspects of 
natural man, Locke believed that man originally was good and that only 
conflict over rights forced man to seek society and the social 
contract. Man had perfect freedom to do as he wished concerning his 
actions, his possessions and himself, but he did not have license. 
Nature had laws and all men were subject to it, and reason was that 
laxv. Man had only to consult his oxvn reason to knoxv he ought not to 
kill himself or harm others. (156) In Locke, reason has a much more 
central role to play than in Hobbes. The latter believed that reason 
was merely a means of determining the best means of satisfying the 
desires. For Locke, reason was the foundation of natural law. 
Through his reason, man entered into the social contract, preserved 
his natural rights and freedoms. The social contract reflects the 
concept that all men are, "by nature, all free, equal and 
independent". (157) The first principle of the social contract must 
be majority rule, and everyone must consent to the rule. Only in this 
manner can the society act for all yet retain as much of the natural 
freedom as possible. (158) A tyrant, by his very nature breaks the 
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spirit of that first principle, so on that basis, the people have a 
right to rebel. 
Hobbes and Rousseau felt that life outside a state was unsuitable 
for human needs. Locke, however, believed that man formed a social 
contract to protect his possessions. (159) C.B. MacPherson latched 
onto this idea and presented his concept of 'possessive individualism' 
as the central assumption of liberal political theory: 
The core of Locke's individualism is the assertion 
that every man is naturally the sole proprietor of 
his oxvn person and capacities - the absolute 
proprietor in the sense that he owes nothing to 
society for them - and especially the absolute 
proprietor of his capacity to labour. (160) 
The rights, then, are for those with property, for it is among these 
that the state xvas made. It is interesting that in English society, 
until the late 19th century, there were that class xvhich consisted of 
gentlemen, and another class which xvas the masses, however, it is not 
a central core to the concept of individualism. DesCartes viewed the 
"I" as the pilot of the ship i.e. the body. The "I" possessed the 
body. This did not mean that DesCartes viexved mankind as being 
divided into two classes: those "I"'s possessing bodies and those 
xvithout. 
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Rousseau added to the social contract theory, the concept that 
morality is formed in the process of making the contract. Men have no 
rights or duties except towards other men, and only in society do men 
realize xvhat these rights and duties are. (161) This 'morality' 
process affects men so that nexv ideas, new values and new goals exist 
that were impossible beyond society. The state of nature xvas not a 
bad place to be, according to Rousseau. He believed that the state 
xvas created by the rich to protect property. This has led men to be 
more succeptible to vice than virtue, and he has been corrupted. Yet 
the individual has new rights and status under the contract: 
Each of us puts his person and all his poxver in 
common under the supreme direction of the general 
will, and, in our corporate capacity, xve receive 
each member as an indivisible part of the whole. 
(162) 
However, a totalitarian element enters into his scheme. The 
individuals give up all their rights and freedoms in the contract, and 
in return each becomes a part of the whole - no part being greater 
than another. The whole becomes the general will and it represents 
every single part. As a result: 
...the sovereign, being formed wholly of the 
individuals who compose it, neither has nor can 
have any interest contrary to theirs; and 
consequently the sovereign power need give no 
quarantee to its subjects... 
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The social contract tacitly includes the principle: 
...that xvhoever refuses to obey the general will 
shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. 
This means nothing less than that he will be forced 
to be free; for this is the condition which... 
secures him against all personal dependence... 
(163) 
The Social Contract theory had gone through a metamorphesis. 
Hobbes believed that to escape a nasty and brutish natural state, all 
power had to be placed in the hands of a Leviatan. Locke found the 
state of nature more pleasing but reason persuaded men to place power 
in the hands of the aristocracy in order to ensure the privileges of 
property. However, Rousseau xvanted to put all the power in the concept 
of the general will which was the xvill of all the people as a unit. 
Hobbes felt the state gave security in place of freedom xvhile Rousseau 
felt the state gave a kind of freedom to the people. The state was 
now involved in an 'ought' or teleological situation. It is no longer 
the present tense 'Greatest Good' but a future tense 'greatest good 
for the individual'. Man had to have his nature changed by the state. 
Walter Ullman has said that the Middle Ages produced a division of 
concepts between man as subject and man as citizen. In the 
development of the social contract theory, man as citizen seems to 
have gained the upper hand. In Rousseau we find man's nature and his 
bonds of citizenship are founded in society or the state. In Hobbes 
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xve find indications that man as a xvorshipper is also found in a 
society, i.e., religious authority is due to the consent of the 
worshippers. Man as a citizen owes a number of his rights and 
freedoms to man in nature according to Locke, but Hobbes and Rousseau 
believed these were traded for civil rights and freedoms. 
Individualism had arrived at a point where the individual had xvithin 
himself the necessary justification for morality for law and for the 
state. No other foundation xvas necessary. From the 18th century to 
the present, much of the development of individualism xvas due to the 
explanations of what the characteristics of an individual are. Kant 
found that the basis of man's autonomy was his reason; Bentham found 
that the state or society was but an aggregate of individuals brought 
together by the calculations of each individual. The only human 
entity was the autonomous, separate, isolate, atomistic, unique, or 
distinct individual. All other human concepts such as society, 
community, state, and nation are merely tools or constructs of each 
individual mind. All the ties that had absorbed the individual of the 
tribes had been broken in the religious evolvement of the individual 
relationship of the one soul and his God. With the advent of Deism, 
even that final tie xvith God had been broken for God no longer cared 
or took an interest in the world he created. Oakshott's thesis that 
individualism erupts after the breakdoxvn of an integrated society is 
worthxvhile if we narrow our scope to the last eight hundred years of 
xvestern history. However, other integrated societies have broken 
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apart yet individualism as xve knoxv it had not occurred before. 
Individualism must have a cultural perception of its basic principles 
or viexvpoint embedded in the previous culture before its eruption, 
otherwise a new form of an integrated culture xvill emerge again. Were 
class or other social forms the sole focus of study, then we can see 
the breakdown occurring. However, what I xvould claim, and I believe 
have shoxvn, is that the change betxveen the time of John of Salisbury 
and that of Kant, is a natural progression given the underlying themes 
and the drives within the culture itself. No breakdoxvn occurred, only 
a transformation. The impetus for creating the concept of the 
individual as we knoxv it today, came from the fundamental changes in 
the theological concepts in the last three thousand years:from the new 
covenant in the Babylonian captivity to the concept of salvation 
created by Jesus, to the Deistic God of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. The concept of the individual as the basic human unit is 
largely the creation of, or the by-product of, the evolving 
theological concepts of the Judeo-Christian ethos. 
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Part Two 
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Let us suppose that the concept of the individual as the basic 
unit of society, or the basic human unit, is indeed a derivative of a 
theological process. Should such a development of the concept be 
true then how xve viexv the human and the human culture ought to be 
reviewed. What I would like to do in the folloxving section is to 
present a picture of a basic human unit that is not the individual, 
nor is it the state, nor is it society. The idea is to present a 
plausible depiction of a human unit other than that of the individual, 
yet one xvhich is not a societally holistic unit. Should a nexv human 
unit be depicted, and should it be an acceptable hypothesis warranting 
further investigation, then I shall have accomplished my purpose. 
For the most part, the starting point for the study of man in 
society is that xvhich the author believes to be uniquely human in 
contradistinction to all other things. For one it is "consciousness", 
for another it is "rights", for another it may be the ability to use 
tools, symbols, or nature, and so on. I xvish to start by claiming 
that man(xvhatever the unit) is a creature, an animate being, an 
organism, a biological entity. It is not a claim that man is only an 
organism, it is but a starting point. As a biological entity, it has 
developed through a biological process and xve must examine its origin, 
reproduction, structure, groxvth and development as a species. To 
begin, as Hegel does in his The Phenomenan of Mind, xvith one 
consciousness and then examine the process of awareness in an almost 
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spatially expanding manner, fails to grasp the duration of the human 
life process. It may be claimed that consciousness as such is not 
inherited, but there are few doubts that life itself is inherited. On 
a fundamental level are the biological processes. Should they cease, 
so does the all that is human. (I am in agreement xvith St. Thomas 
that the soul by itself is not a person.) Should consciousness cease 
under certain circumstances, the body can continue to live, to dream, 
and even to think. I do not intend that the body and the mind are txvo 
separate entities or even that they are entities. Consciousness is an 
ascription of the human. 
Through the examination of the history of the life process and the 
biological development of the human, I hope to find some principles 
xvhich xvill enable us to understand the "mind of man". From these 
principles, I hope to establish the foundation for the basic human 
unit, for man in community, and (in Part Three) for man in society. 
It may be that my definitions of "community" and "society" and my 
examination of the distinctions betxveen the two concepts will be 
prejudiced for I use, what some people criticize as conservative, the 
concepts outlined by Jacques Maritain and Ferdinand Toennies. I have 
used their concepts because of the importance they attached to these 
txvo concepts and their differences, and their intense interest in 
these concepts in their theories. Toennies' xvork on these txvo 
concepts is exceptional in its scope and erudition. Each has an 
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exact, clear and consistent image of xvhat the concepts mean and hoxv 
they differ. It is for this reason I "purloined" their descriptions. 
In the Introduction, it was claimed that there were four concepts 
linked to the "individual": 1) "individuality or separateness", 2) 
"personality", 3) "autonomy or self-governing", and 4) "being or 
completeness". The first concept involves the simple existent or the 
spatial element. One stone is a unit separate spatially from another 
stone. The boundaries of each stone are distinct and particular. 
Except for spatial relationships and the actual mineral formation, 
there is no necessary relationship betxveen one rock and another nor 
its environment. An amoeba is also a unit separate spatially from 
another amoeba. The boundaries of each are distinct (although 
changing) and particular. Hoxvever, there is a necessary relationship 
betxveen the amoeba and its environment and between one amoeba and 
another. For the former, the amoeba must interact xvith its environment 
in order to live, and for the latter, the amoeba must interact xvith 
other amoeba in order to transmit life. 
The "life" element of animate creatures prohibits the isolation of 
inanimate objects. There is no simple separate isolated animate being. 
Hoxvever, our original definition could claim that the amoeba is 
existing and functioning independently, i.e. not dependent on 
something else. It uses various items to maintain its existence, no 
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one of them absolutely essential for the maintenance of life. As well, 
it is differentiated from other amoeba, i.e., separate. The life 
element did offer nexv complications: 1) in order to maintain it, the 
amoeba (all animate creatures) must interact xvith its environment, 
and, 2) in order to have life, the amoeba had to"receive" it from 
another amoeba. Without life, the amoeba xvould be reduced to myriads 
of inanimate substances. It is life that gives the amoeba its 
xvholeness or unity. 
When xve speak of individual biological units, we are talking about 
units of life. To discuss any biological unit without taking into 
account life: the reproduction of life, the maintenance of life, the 
structure of life etc., is to lose sight of the xvhole core of animate 
creatures. Surely the continuation of life is the main purpose of the 
amoeba's existence. 1. Restructuring chemical and mineral substances 
and being a food source are by products of this purpose. (No "divine" 
or "rational" inference is meant in the use of the xvord "purpose".) 
The amoeba, therefore, is a "transmitter", taking life from that xvhich 
anteceded it and created it, and passing it on to its descendents. The 
biologic unit, then, is a unit of life, or if xve think of life as 
being a continuing event, a "life-moment". If the amoeba, is to be a 
biologic unit, it must hold entirely within itself the ability to 
transmit or continue life. As anyone xvho has studied high school 
biology knows, the amoeba has the ability to separate itself into txvo 
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nexv amoeba. It needs no other amoeba to help it produce nexv life. It 
is a biologic unit, i.e., an individual unit. It is complete xvithin 
itself, because it performs its primary purpose independently. 
When a more complex being like man is examined, we find that it is 
an animate creature that must interact xvith its environment in order 
to live, and it, too, must interact xvith other human beings in order 
to transmit life. At first perception, the human is separate, i.e., 
differentiated, from others of its kind. Hoxvever, xvhen xve examine 
humans as "life-moments", we find that the human is not capable of 
transmitting life, i.e., reproducing itself, independently. The human 
being is not a complete biological unit. The human kind is divided 
into txvo parts: male and female. In fact, they are divided along lines 
that involve the reproduction and maintenance of life. The necessary 
requirements for the transmission of life are one male and one female 
xvithin an anatomically and biologically correct time span. (And, of 
course, proximity.) The "xvhole" that is needed to transmit life 
consists of two human beings: one of each sex; of one of each separate 
reproductive physiology. 
There are additional problems. The old amoeba disappeared as the 
txvo nexv ones appeared. Humans, being more complex, do not disappear in 
the process of reproduction but, because they must reproduce a highly 
ordered structure, they are required to aid the descendent in its 
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life-groxvth and life-maintenance. Part of the life process, then, is 
the maintenance of nexv life by the old life, i.e., a child is 
dependent upon adults for survival. Human life-transmitters must 
overlap in order for life to continue. 
A biological unit, therefore, cannot consist only of one human 
being. If a biological unit is to be defined as the "whole" 
containing the essential elements necessary for the continuation of 
life, then the human biological unit must be the "xvhole" that contains 
the male and female (capable of reproduction) and the dependent 
infant. There must be a biological orientation in all three abstract 
parts to form the "xvhole" biological unit. The instances (i.e., the 
particular man, xvoman or child) of the abstract parts need not be the 
same in every "whole". For instance, parents reject and adopt babies, 
fathers reject mothers, etc. Nevertheless, the orientation toxvard the 
human biological whole must be there or human life xvould cease, and 
this orientation toward a biologic "xvhole" must permeate the entirety 
of the human. Our genetic structure, our feelings, our emotions, our 
thinking must reflect this fundamental orientation. Josiah Royce 
recognized an orientation toxvard the other although he did not give it 
the same substance as I do. 
As a matter of psychology, i.e. of the natural 
history of our beliefs, a vague belief in the 
existence of our felloxvs seems to antedate, to a 
considerable extent, the definite formation of any 
107 
consciousness of ourselves.... We are social beings 
first of all by virtue of our inherited instincts, 
and xve love, fear, and closely xvatch our felloxvs, 
in advance of any definite ideas about xvhat our 
felloxvs really are. Our more explicit 
consciousness that our felloxvs exist is due to a 
gradual interpretation of these our deepest social 
instincts Our assurance about our fellows 
arises by means of those very interests xvhereby we 
gradually come to our oxvn self-consciousness. 2. 
Another indication of the inherited "orientation", particularly of 
the child for the adult humans are the results of several empirical 
studies. It is knoxvn, for instance, that a child xvill automatically 
smile at any stimulus having a certain degree of resemblance to a 
human face.3. An experimant xvith rhesus monkeys by H.F.Harloxv, 
discovered that by using various substitutes for real mothers the 
development of the infant could be drastically affected. An 
indication that the "need" of the infants for a "mother"figure xvas not 
reinforced behavior, xvas one experiment xvhere a xvire frame with 
nipples for food and a cloth covered frame xvithout nipples for food 
xvere placed in the same cage as the young monkeys. The young monkeys 
went to the cloth covered frame although it gave them no food. Food 
or food giving did not alter their almost instinctive behaviour.4. 
When the process of life is considered, each man, xvoman and child 
is merely a partial "life-moment". A xvhole human "life-moment" (the 
basic unit for the transmission of life) orients all three parts 
toxvard a biological "xvhole". What xve normally consider an "individual" 
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must be considered merely a part or an aspect of a "xvhole". Each man, 
xvoman and child cannot exist separately, and cannot be considered 
complete in and of themselves. Only the "life-moment" or the human 
biological "whole" can be considered as a human unit, as a distinct, 
individual entity. The human biological "xvhole" is already a group. 
Aristotle pointed out these facts in his The Politics. In the 
second paragraph of the book, he says: 
We ... get the best viexv of the matter if xve look 
at the natural groxvth of things from the beginning. 
The first point is that those which are ineffective 
without each other must be united in a pair. For 
example the union of male and female is essential 
for reproduction, since each is powerless without 
the other; and this is not a matter of choice, but 
is due to the desire, implanted by nature in both 
animals and plants, to propagate one's kind.5. 
One could object to the xvords "pair", "union" because they harbour 
visions of txvo complete and separate units, for on the next page he 
adds: 
Our own observation tells us that every state is an 
association of persons formed with a view to some 
good purpose. I say "good" because in their actions 
all men do in fact aim at what they think good. 
Clearly then, as all associations aim at some good, 
that one xvhich is supreme and embraces all others 
will have also as its aim the supreme good. That is 
the association xvhich xve call the state, and that 
type of association we call political.6. 
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For Aristotle, the mating pair (and slaves) form a "household", 
and households form a village and several villages form a state xvith 
some "good" in mind. The xvhole process was a natural evolution. The 
pair mated to reproduce according to the dictates of nature; villages 
formed over time from the extended family; and states xvere formed by 
villages because all the people xvere related or they needed security 
or self-sufficiency. The man ruled the household, the father the 
family, the eldest the village and the state. It was upon this 
foundation that much of medieval political thought xvas founded. It is 
still the foundation of Thomist thought today. 
However, an association is a xvilled or voluntary idea consisting 
of units joined together, and Aristotle introduces the concept of 
"person" and a purpose i.e., the "good". He indicates that there is 
more to human than the biological existent. Richard M. Weaver 
describes the "person" as folloxvs: 
It seems a threshold fact that personality is some 
kind of integration. The individual xvhora we regard 
as having authentic personality appears to possess 
a center, and everything that he does is in 
relation to this The true personality is a 
psychic unity, preserving its identity and giving a 
sort of thematic continuity to the acts of the 
individual.7. 
Further on, he indicates that "the personality is a morally 
oriented unit". This opinion is reflected by Aristotle's use of "an 
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association of persons formed xvith a viexv to some good purpose". 
Johannes Messner states: "The development of the human person is, in 
light of Natural Laxv ethics, man's self-realization in accordance 
with the order indicated in his nature ". 8. The "person" seems to be 
rooted in ethics or morality and is each human's identity. 
The philosophical idea of the person is clearly of 
Christian origin. In the language of the Greeks, 
the word person has no application in philosophy 
because Greek Philosophy had no term that meant 
xvhat xve call the person. The Greek never prefixed 
the "I" to the verb to be, at least never with any 
significant value so that such a sentence 
constituted anything fundamental for religion or 
philosophy. It was Christ who said of himself that 
"I am the way, the truth and the life," 
synthesizing in the unity of a real and living 
person this affirmation of a supreme interior life 
and of absolute independence which were impossible 
for Parmenides' Being or for Plato's Idea of Good 
and making possible, in a concrete, personal, and 
historical program, the function of truth, xvay, and 
life as the unity of persons.9. 
Both ethics or morality and identity are related to "freedom" and 
"choice". Felix Morley indicates that "xvhat we really mean by 
individualism is the latitude of a person to choose for himself among 
the many fruits of a civilization in which he is an active 
participant."10. 
No man alone need worry about ethics, morality or identity. All 
three are socially oriented concepts. 
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A human organism is individualized through a 
learning or conditioning process xvithin natural and 
human environments. Through affiliations and 
participations are produced abilities to 
understand, to appreciate, and to perform within 
environments. This complex of abilities constitutes 
and characterizes an individual. As xvilliam James 
pointed out, the "I" of self is a mine-ness of 
relationships and functions.il. 
The "person"-individual seems to be a focal subjective core 
involving choice restrained by a social environment. The "person" also 
involves "autonomy" and it is the autonomous character of each human 
that creates individuality. "Autonomy", rationalism and individualism 
are mutually interdependent. A society, then, would be 
inter-subjective, or as Ferdinand Toennies puts it: "Human wills stand 
in manifold relations to one another". 12. However, above xve tried to 
shoxv that the human biological "xvhole" xvas already a group. 
Jacques Maritain and Ferdinand Toennies xvere careful to 
distinguish between the txvo concepts of "community" and "society. For 
instance, Maritain states in Man and the State: 
Both community and society are ethico-social and 
truly human, not mere biological realities. But a 
community is more of a xvork of nature and more 
nearly related to the biological; a society is more 
of a work of reason, and more nearly related to the 
intellectual and spiritual properties of 
man 13. 
Coming from a Thomist viexvpoint, Maritain insists on the moral or 
ethical basis for both concepts. The "Community" is the "Fact" that 
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precedes reason and xvill and acts independently of them "to create a 
common unconscious psyche, common feelings and psychological 
structures and common mores". The "society" has a "project", "task" or 
"end" to be achieved and depends on reason and xvill. Toennies makes a 
similar distinction. The community involves a "real and organic life" 
xvhile the society is an "imaginary and mechanical structure". "All 
intimate, private, and exclusive living together ... is understood as 
life" in a community, xvhile society is public life. 14 . One is born 
into a family and is bound to it and this is a reflection of 
community. Societies are to be kept or formed for given purposes. The 
community is old xvhereas the society is new as a name and as a 
phenomenon. 
Toennies goes on in Part II to claim that the foundation of 
'community' is the "natural will" whereas the foundation of 'society' 
is the "rational-will". The "natural will" is an aspect of the "self" 
xvhile the "rational xvill" is an aspect of the "person". The "natural 
will" of a group is composed of understanding, custom, belief, or 
faith or creed, concord, mores, religion etc., while the "rational 
will" in a group is composed of convention, legislation public 
opinion, contracts, regulations and doctrines. Basically these 
components reflect a break betxveen the concepts of culture (natural 
will) and civilization (rational xvill). 
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Toennies was a critic of the organic theories, although he did 
recognize the importance of the continuation of life for human kind. 
It is easy to adopt his "natural xvill" and with a fexv modifications, 
apply it to xvhat I had called the orientation of the human biological 
"whole". Feeling, such as love, liking, anger, kindness, passion, 
etc., are socially or other directed and necessary for continuing 
life, and these come naturally to human beings. An amoeba has 
absolutely no need for such feelings but man, through evolutionary 
chance, must adapt himself to a genetic "program" (this concept is not 
absolutely deterministic but has a meaning more akin to 
"preestablished pattern") xvhich includes a biological "xvhole". 
Noam Chomsky and his school of linguistic analysis feels that 
there is one basic "form" common to all human languages. This form, he 
believes, must be considered innate and part of the definition of the 
species. Linguistic capability, then, is due, not only to advances in 
culture, but also to man's physical evolution. Other evidence supports 
this claim. Studies have shoxvn that children learn languages in 
basically the same manner and at the same times, without learning 
rules nor imitating adults. First they learn xvords then a syntax that 
is not mere imitation of the adults. Tliere seems to be a universal 
"program" that is a part of the species. 15. If an evolutionary and 
genetic "program" exists for language skills, then xvhy not other 
"programs" for the fundamental categories of cognition in man and 
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perhaps for other elements of the human that are less basic but of 
great importance to the relationship of the human and the human 
society. 
We cannot think outside the particular patterns 
that our brains are conditioned to.... It xvas this 
long evolution - not recent history, not the 
periods since the Romans or Greeks, for instance 
-that determined our basic physical and 
psychological characteristics. 16. 
In any case, cognitive functions need language as an instrument or 
they xvould be of little use. The evolutionary and genetic "program" of 
mankind is the foundation and the Aristotelian "form" of all cognitive 
functions of the human, and cannot be hostile to the continuation of 
human life. 
Nature, hoxvever, has neglected to be specific in its "orientation" 
because the "program" in existence has been more than adequate to 
insure the continuation of human life, and because man is such a 
complex creature. Each man and woman is oriented toxvard a biological 
"whole" yet the parts need not be specific. Despite the attitude that 
there is a "right" woman for each man and a "Mr. Right" for each xvoman 
and that couples xvere "made for each other", the mating pair can 
include any man and any xvoman. The next "mating" of each of the 
former pair may easily be xvith other "mates". Homosexuality can be 
seen as a distortion of the natural orientation to the biological 
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"xvhole". The parts of the "xvhole", then, are interchangeable, yet 
necessarily bound together by life and the "life-moment". Although 
John Dewey xvould disagree xvith most of ray paper, he did indicate the 
"fact" of this communal orientation: 
Individuals xvho are not bound together in 
associations ... are monstrosities. It is absurd to 
suppose that the ties xvhich hold them together are 
merely external and do not react into mentality and 
character, producing the framexvork of personal 
disposition.17. 
(The non-rational tenor of the paragraph contradicts the rational 
undertones to the concept "associations".) 
The non-specificity of the "orientation" allows the "orientation" 
functions (feelings, etc) to include a larger number of "parts" than 
are absolutely necessary for a "life-moment" or a biological "whole". 
It is for this reason that pictures of children in distress evoke such 
a strong response, or that a proximate human in danger usually will 
obtain our help. Hoxvever, the "orientation function" cannot be 
stretched indefinitely. Toennies perception that "community" includes 
"all intimate, private and exclusive living together", "language, 
folkways or mores, or beliefs", and "locality" accurately notes the 
limitations of the concept and the limitations of the "poxver" of the 
orientation to the biological "whole". The importance of "proximity" 
and "locality" to the concept of community cannot be overlooked. The 
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alienation, isolation and loneliness of a person in a large city 
results from the barriers that separate the person from "community" 
and the biological "xvhole". Those barriers are lack of "proximity" and 
"locality", and the lack of a potential biological "xvhole"-- i.e., 
lack of intimacy. The people next door or at xvork etc. lack "humanity" 
for her because of the lack of "intimacy", a difficult thing to 
develop. 
A major part of the psychological theories of Carl Gustav Jung 
lends itself to the idea of biological xvholes and mental patterning. 
For Jung, man has three parts to his psyche: the ego or the 
conscious part; the personal unconscious ; the "collective" 
uconscious. It is the "collective" unconsious that is a peculiarly 
Jungian concept and one that has been heavily criticized by many 
psychological theorists. Yet Jung defended his concept throughout his 
life and there are indications of grudging agreement by his former 
mentor, Sigmund Freud. 
...dreams bring to light material xvhich cannot have 
originated either from the dreamer's adult life or 
from his forgotten childhoold. We are obliged to 
regard it as part of the archaic heritage xvhich a 
child brings xvith him into the world^ before any 
experience of his oxvn, influenced by the experience 
of his ancestors. We find the counterpart of this 
phylogenetic material in the earliest human legends 
and in survivig customs. Thus dreams constitute a 
source of human prehistory xvhich is not to be 
despised.18. 
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T,Mle both men xvere in agreement that there xvere instincts, drives 
or innate tendencies that provided material xvhich could not have 
originated within the history of the particular individual, Jung 
exlored the source for this material to a far greater degree. Both 
men found material or images, symbols etc., in dreams xvhich they had 
to attribute to a genetic history of experience and Jung called this 
the "collective" unconscious. 
The collective unconscious...as the ancestral 
heritage of possibilities of representation, is not 
individual but common to all men, and perhaps even 
to all animals, and is the true basis of the 
indivudual psyche. This xvhole psyche organism 
corresponds exactly to the body....19 
While the "collective unconscious" is an ancient psychic heritage, it 
oxves nothing of its existance to the present individual except as a 
carrier or medium. 
The collective unconscious is a part of the psyche 
which can be negatively distinguished from a 
personal unconscious by the fact that is does not, 
like the later, oxve its existence to personal 
experience and cosequently is not a personal 
acquisiton. While the personal unconscious is made 
up essentially of contents xvhich have at one time 
been conscious but xvhich have disappeared from 
consciousness, having been forgotten or repressed, 
the contents of the collective unconscious have 
never been in consciousness, and therefore have 
never been individually acquired, but owe their 
existence exclusively to heredity. Whereas, the 
personal unconscious consists for the most part of 
"complexes", the content of the collective 
unconscious is made up essentially of 
"archetypes".20 
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He adds a claim that his concept of the archetype is similar to that 
of "motifs" of mythological research; to Levy-Bruhl's concept of 
"representations collectives"; to the categories of the imagination 
concept of Hubert and Mauss; and the "primordial thoughts" of Adolf 
Bastian. 
It is the "collective unconscious" xvhich is the basis for the 
xvhole psyche of the individual. The individual's oxvn conscious and 
personal unconscious are founded and formed by the "collective 
unconscious". 
...the unconscious, as the totality of all 
archetypes, is the deposit of all human experience 
right back to its remotest beginnings...a living 
system of reactions and aptitudes that determine 
the individual's life in invisible ways...From the 
living fountain of instinct floxvs everything that 
is creative; hence the unconscious is not merely 
conditioned by history, but is the very source of 
the creative impulse.21 
The strength of the foundation and its poxver over the rest of the 
psyche is not to be dismissed lightly. 
We only understood that kind of thinking which is 
mere equation, from xvhich nothing comes outbut xvhat 
xve have put in. That is the xvorking of the 
intellect. But besides that, there is a thinking 
in primordial images, in symbols which are older 
than the historical man, xvhich are inborn in him 
fromthe earliest times, and eternally living, 
outlasting all generations, still make up the 
ground xvork of the human psyche. It is only 
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possible to live the fullest life xvhen xve are in 
harmony xvith these symbols; xvisdom is a return to 
them. It is a question neither of belief nor of 
knoxvledge, but of the agreement of our thinking 
xvith the primordial images of the unconscious. 
They are the unthinkable matricies of all our 
thoughts, no matter xvhat our conscious mind may 
cogitate.22. 
The "conscious" or the "ego" is almost dismissed not as an existent 
but a substantive existent with its oxvn creative poxver. 
...the gifts of reason and critical reflection is 
not one of man's outstanding peculiarities, and 
even xvhere it exists it proves to be wavering and 
inconstant, the more so, as a rule, the bigger the 
political groups are. 23 
The collective unconscious contains the xvhole spiritual heritage 
of mankind's evolution, born anexv in the brain structure of every 
individual. His conscious mind is an ephemeral phenomenon that 
accomplishes all provisional adaptations and orientations, for xvhich 
reason one can best compare its function to spatial orientation. The 
unconscious, on the other hand, is the source of the instinctual 
forces of the psyche and of the forms or categories that regulate 
them, namely the achetypes. all the most powerful ideas in history go 
back to archetypes. This is particularly true of religious ideas, but 
the central concepts of science, philosophy, and ethics are no 
exception to this rule. In their present form, they are varients of 
archetypal ideas, created by consciously applying and adapting these 
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ideas to reality. For it is the function of consciousness not only to 
recognize and assimilate the external world through the gateway of the 
senses, but to translate into visible reality the xvorld xvithin us. 24 
Such strong claims, despite case and mythic examples, have been 
severly criticised, almost laughed at. The contempt Philip Rieff 
holds for Jung's concept of the collective "unconscious" and his 
methodology erupts to the surface on almost every page of the chapter 
on Jung's theories in his book, The Triumph of The Therapeutic. for 
Rieff, Jung's theory of the "collective unconscious" is a seedy 
attempt to renexv and revamp antiquated romantic values and ideas, and 
to provide a nexv basis for a religion. However, he does hold Jung's 
ideas as a serious challenge and an important concept, though a false 
one. The true nature of religion is "a private version of a deeply 
and even unconsciously held communal faith"25 and it "erupts, 
paradoxically, from the collective unconscious." The individual may 
have his oxvn religious images yet they are "merely particular 
varieties" of the collective or communal faith. 
The colletive unconscious...is the predicate of 
individuation. Jung's psychology of the 
unconscious is not...a version of the pietist 
doctrine of the inxvardness of all religious 
feeling, irreducibly personal and almost 
uncommunicable. On the contrary, the unconscious 
is Jung's psychologically functional equivalent of 
communities and, in fact, derives its content from 
the culture. It is in the sense of a derivation 
from, and individuation of the cultural community, 
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that the unconscious is "collective". The notion 
is a daring advance on the far older one of an 
invisible church. It has yet to be taken 
seriously, the less so as the doctrine of the 
church has fallen into disuse. The first question 
is whether any test can be devised for it - that 
is, whether this notion can be used. 26 
It is a notion xvhich Rieff believes not only to be xvrong, but 
untestable, unusable - in fact, to be "the language of faith", yet one 
to be considered seriously because of the rest of its subtle and 
appealing persuasiveness. Jung must speak for himself (and he does so 
voluminously). 
For Jung, then, there is almost a communal nature to man, i.e., 
the individual was born a community and not an individual. Yet, his 
theory is not closed or substantively fixed in the same xvay as 
B.F.Skinner's theories are. 
A person is first of all an organism, a member of a 
species and subspecies, possessing a genetic 
endoxvment of anatomical and physiological 
characterisics, xvhich are the product of the 
contingencies of survival to xvhich the species has 
been exposed in the process of evolution. The 
organism becomes a person as it acquires a 
repertoire of behavior under the contingencies of 
reinforcement to which it is exposed during its 
lifetime. The behavior it exhibits at any moment 
is under control of a current setting.... A person 
is not an originating agent; he is a locus, a point 
at xvhich many genetic and environmental conditions 
come together in a joint effect.27. 
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Jung recognizes the reductionist arguement in such a position of 
Skinner's and refused to be trapped by it. The ego is an existent and 
it and the personal unconscious must be in balance or in harmony xvith 
the "collective unconscious" for a healthy psyche. Too great a 
submission to the collective unconscious is as harmful as repression 
of or opposition to it. "Directedness is absolutely necessary for 
the conscious process" yet this "directed" aspect hinders the 
unconscious tendencies from creeping into the conscious, producing a 
onesidedness that is unhealthy.28. The balance itself varies 
according to the type of personality or "attitude" types, xvhich are 
the "introvert" and the "extravert". The introvert tends more to the 
rational or conscious, xvhile the extravert submits to a greater degree 
to the collective unconscious aspects of his psyche. There is an 
overlapping of polar opposites: the "introvert" and the "extravert"; 
and "thinking" and "feeling" (the polar opposites of the mental 
processes of the psyche). The individual personality then can be 
placed on the scale betxveen the complete introvert and the complete 
extravert, and on the scale betxveen thinking and feeling (i.e., does 
he do much contemplation, or does he react instinctively and 
emotionally).29. Extremes on both scales must be considered: 
... the individual ego ... is that continous 
centre of consciousness xvhose presence has made 
itself felt since the days of childhood. It is 
confronted xvith a psyche product that oxves its 
existence mainly to an unconscious process and is 
therefore in some degree opposed to the ego and its 
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tendencies. This standpoint is essential in coming 
to terms xvith the unconscious. The position of the 
ego must be maintained as being of equal value to 
the counter-position of the unconscious, and vice 
versa. This ammounts to a very necessary xvarning: 
for just as the conscious mind of civilized man has 
a restrictive effect on the unconscious, so the 
rediscovered unconcious often has a really 
dangerous effect on the ego.30. 
Jung's theory, then, in brief, is that each human being has txvo 
major pshycic sources: the individual's conscious and unconscious, 
based on his own individual experience or history; and the collective 
unconscious based on an inherited , genetic, or innate tendencies 
created by the common experiences of all human life history, or even 
all animate life history. The latter is almost a genetic Avoerrist 
soul, commonly shared by every human individual. The "collective 
unconscious" is a genetic matrix from which the personal unconscious 
and the conscious sloxvly and tentatively emerge. The personality of 
the individual reflects to xvhat degree the individual uses his 
emotions or his reason to deal xvith the xvorld, and to what degree the 
individual identifies with the "collective unconscious" or the "ego". 
A healthy psyche is one xvhere there is a balance betxveen the personal 
and collective parts of the psyche, betxveen the introverted and 
extraverted attitudes, betxveen emotion or feeling, and reason. That 
this is a severely skeletal sketch of Jung's theory, and that it is 
only a small part of the marvelous work of a great thinker, must be 
understood. I cannot hope to present an adequate description of his 
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thories here. 
Jung did not eliminate the purposive, intentional, creative man, 
for these are the concepts he himself applies to the conscious, but he 
did place severe restrictions on those aspects. 
No matter hoxv beautiful and perfect man may believe 
his reason to be, he can alxvays be certain that it 
is only one of the possible mental functions, and 
covers only that one side of the phenomenal xvorld 
xvhich corresponds to it. But the irrational, that 
xvhich is not agreeable to reason, rings it about on 
all sides. And the irrational is likexvise a 
psychological function - in a word, it is the 
collective unconscious; xvhereas the rational is 
essentially tied to the conscious mind.31. 
The collective unconscious not only is the matrix, the foundation 
for the human psyche, not only surrounds and impregnates the xvhole 
psyche, but it almost totally dominates the young child, and resists 
the eruption of a personal conscious. At first, the child has 
sporadic consciousness, "limited to the perception of a fexv 
connections betxveen two or more psychic contents", and there is no 
continuous memory. Tliese "islands of memory" are the first stirrings 
of the ego. 
Only later, xvhen the ego-contents - the so-called 
ego-complex - have acquired an energy of their oxvn 
(very likely as a result of training and practice) 
does the feeling of subjectivity or 'I-ness' arise. 
This may well be the moment xvhere the child begins 
to speak of itself in the first person. 
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Still the child is dependent on his parents. 
Psychic birth, and xvith it the conscious 
differentiation from the parents, normally takes 
place only at puberty, xvith the eruption of 
sexuality. The physiological change is attended by 
a psychic revolution.... Until this period is 
reached the psychic life of the individual is 
governed largely by instinct, and fexv or no 
problems arise.32. 
The xvorld of the collective unconscious contains primordial images 
or "archetypes" which "are the most ancient and the most universal 
'thought-forms' of humanity", and they are "as much feelings as 
thoughts".33. The source of these archetypes are the "deposits of the 
constantly repeated experiences of humanity."34. The contents of the 
personal unconscious are "memory-images" personally experienced by the 
individual, xvhereas the archetypes or primordial images are not 
personally experienced but are genetic givens.35. The common 
symbolism of the myths and legends, and of dreams, attest to a common 
viexv of experience and to the collective psyche. 
Ernst Cassirer, and his followers, have also discovered the 
collective images or symbols concept in the myths and legends. For 
Cassirer, man is a symbol maker, and it is this unusual activity that 
is the basis for man's ability to conceptualize. "Man lives in a 
symbolic universe". "Language, myth, art, and religion are parts of 
this universe. They are the varied threads xvhich xveave the symbolic 
net, the tangled xveb of human experience".36. Man is to be defined, 
126 
not as animal rationale but as animal symbolicum. There are some 
medical incidents to back up such a concept. Aphasia victims usually 
can perform many menial or everyday tasks, but have great difficulty 
in conceptualizing. 
Myth and mythical symbols are also very important in Cassirer's 
philosophy. For him, myth is "an instrument of the great process of 
spiritual differentiation through which basic determinate forms of 
social and individual consciousness arise from the chaos of the first 
indeterminate life feeling."37. This process accomplishes txvo things 
which are not inseparable but are stages in the same development: a 
sense of community and individuality. The mythical-religious 
consciousness is the foundation for all society. 
The very existence and form of human society itself 
requires such a foundation; for even xvhere xve 
suppose that we have society before us in its 
empirically earliest and most primitive form, it is 
not something originally given but something 
spiritually conditioned and mediated. All social 
existence is rooted in concrete forms of community 
and the feeling of community. And the more xve 
succeed in laying bare this root, the more evident 
it becomes that the primary feeling of community 
never stops at the dividing lines which xve posit in 
our highly developed biological class concepts but 
goes beyond them toxvard the totality of living 
things. Long before man had knoxvledge of himself 
as a separate species distinguished by some 
specific poxver and singled out from nature as a 
xvhole by a life as a whole, xvithin xvhich each 
individual creature and thing is magically 
connected xvith the xvhole, so that a continuous 
transition, a meta morphosis of one being in 
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another, appears not only as possible but as 
necessary, as the "natural" form of life itself. 
38. 
It is a remarkably similar description to that of Jung, yet in a 
different field of study, and from a different viexvpoint. It is even 
more remarkable when Cassirer speaks of totems and other religious 
symbols, xvhich are "embedded in a universal mythical view",39 in many 
xvays in the same manner and representing the same concepts as Jung's 
archetypes. I do not intend to claim that Jung's theories and 
Cassirer's theories are identical, merely that, in many xvays, their 
description of the human in culture is remarkably similar. For Jung, 
the collective is in the unconscious, for Cassirer, the community is a 
condition for society and is grounded in the consciousness - in fact, 
it seems to be a category of consciousness, i.e., the "feeling of 
community". 
P.F.Strawson, in his book Individuals, does not describe the human 
in the same manner as Jung, and I believe he would abhor the linking 
of his logic to Jung's theories. Hoxvever, his brilliant essay on the 
"individual" did present the concept of the primitive person. For 
him, the mind and body were not entities but attributes of another 
entity "the person". 
What I mean be the concept of a person is the 
concept of a type of entity such that both 
predicates ascribing states of consciousness and 
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predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a 
physical situation, etc., are equally applicable to 
a single individual of that single type. 40. 
For him, the person is logically prior to and is the ontological 
foundation of, consciousness and the character of the body.41. It is 
partly by this priority that he means "primitive", and, partly, that 
as such, the "primitive person" falls outside the achievement or grasp 
of the consciousness. Jung too believes that the collective 
unconscious itself cannot be perceived directly be the conscious 
because it too is prior to and the foundation of the personal 
conscious. An extension of the concept of the "primitive person" can 
be made to suit the requirements of the concept of the "primitive 
human unit", which xvould be a biological whole, a "community" oriented 
toward the whole through the collective unconscious. Hoxvever, there 
are many differences between the thought of the two men xvhich I will 
not go into here. By introducing the thought of such diverse 
philosophers as Cassirer and Straxvson, I xvish to indicate that 
concepts of other thinkers do indicate a similarity in attitude to the 
problem of the human. 
I had indicated that a "biological whole" or "life-moment" xvould 
require a genetic patterning or orientation xvithin each male and 
female. Chomsky believes that a type of patterning xvas indicated by 
the development of language skills in children, by a fundamental 
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has genetic paradigms, something akin to Kant's categories, and it is 
nigh to impossible to think beyond those limits. Jacques Monod agrees 
xvith Chomsky's conclusions but from the more scientific viexvpoint of a 
genetic researcher. Jung presents a more complete concept of genetic 
patterning, xvith support, small though it be, fro:.i „»„ ^ a „ 
ps,c -~;~1, .>—, Sigmund Freud. Cassirer, too, has a viexv of a 
collective aspect in the human psyche or, as he calls it, the human 
consciousness, for he never speaks of the unconscious at all. 
Straxvson presents a "primitive person" but applies it only to the 
individual. I suggested that Straxvson's concept could be developed 
logically to incorporate the community as an aspect of the primitive 
person. 
The patterning of the "biological xvhole" xvould have to dominate 
the collective unconscious, xvere the idea of a "life-moment" or a 
"life-process" to survive as it has historically. Jung does introduce 
archetypes of the mother and the father. In fact, at one point he 
suggests just such a genetic patterning. 
Tliere is no human experience, nor xvould experience 
be possible at all, xvithout the intervention of a 
subjective aptitude. What is this subjective 
aptitude? Ultimately it consists in an innate 
psychic structure which alloxvs man to have 
experiences of this kind. Thus the x/hole nature of 
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man presupposes xvoman, both psychically and 
spiritually. His system is tuned in to xvoman from 
the start, just as it is prepared for a quite 
definite xvorld where there is water, light, air, 
salt, carbohydrates, etc. The form of the world 
into which he is born is already inborn in him as a 
virtual image. Likewise parents, xvife, children, 
birth and death are inborn in him as virtual 
images, as psychic aptitudes. These a priori 
categories have by nature a collective character; 
they are images of parents, xvife, and children in 
general, and are not individual predestinations. 
42. 
In other xs'ords, we have a collective predisposition, a collective 
psyche with unconscious content xvhich are not the memory images of the 
conscious (although he does not rule out collective memory images) but 
which need individual experience to give it shape, to give it life for 
the conscious. 
The rational or conscious foundation for xvhat is normally called 
relations betxveen individuals has not been examined as yet but, 
considering the concept of human biological xvhole, such a foundation 
is unnecessary for establishing a community. It is communal 
attributes of the human that are the foundation of the community. The 
"orientation" or the partial nature of the individual presumes the 
community or the collective as its foundation. The collective psyche 
is that "orientation" required by the genetic requisites of the 
"process of life". Feelings, emotions, instincts, drives, etc., are 
the functional or activating aspects of the orientation and the 
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archetypes are the substance of that orientation. The community is a 
"real and organic life" to a greater degree than Toennies had 
supposed. The individual is a creature of the community: for the 
original community, the "biological xvhole" is prior in principle and 
in fact to the individual parts into xvhich it has functionally 
diverged itself. Should an individual die, its absence or death 
affects only the size of the community and not the substance, 
content, make-up, form, structure or any other attribute of the 
community. The community is in each human psyche but it is more than 
that. Not only is it in each human psyche but it must be the communal 
female oriented to the biological xvhole, the communal male oriented to 
the biological whole, the child oriented to the biological xvhole, the 
parent oriented to the biological etc. To examine the psyche of one 
individual is to examine only a part of the community, the individual 
can never grasp the "wholeness" of the community. Were there no 
individuals, it is true there would be no community. Where there is 
no community, hoxvever, there would be no individual for the process of 
life ceases. Were half the number of individuals eliminated the 
substance of the community xvould not be affected. Were a functional 
part of the community eliminated i.e. eliminate xvomen, men, parents, 
or children, then the community xvould be damaged if not destroyed and 
xvith it the individuals, over historic duration, xvould be destroyed. 
If no children survived, or there xvere no females, then the adults, or 
the males, xvould live out their lives probably suffering from 
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alienation or anomie, and then mankind xvould cease to exist. In every 
biological sense man is a community of xvhich the " individual" is an 
intrinsic and a functional part or attribute. 
Because of the biological-organic foundation of the concept of 
"community", a definition of "community" xvith rational overtones 
misses the mark. Toivo Miljan xvrote: 
The concept of community may be defined as the 
sharing of some values, beliefs, and interests to a 
greater or lesser" degree] Ethnic community and" 
political community may both" Be defined as the 
sharing of some valuesTpeliefs and" interests and 
founding myths iiid future Utopias, to a greater or 
lesser degree. The difference between ethnic and" 
political community is the addition of such 
specific political values as resourse allocation, 
resource arbitration and legitimacy. (Emphasis 
his.)43. 
Later on he alloxvs that "ethnic and political community are 
undifferentiated and organic in both conceptualization and operation", 
but he misses the point that man is community by definition and by 
nature. Man does not "share" in a community, for "share" has rational 
and voluntary values to its meaning xvhile community is a basic organic 
"need" "orientation" and is not voluntary. Similarly, "founding myths 
and future Utopias" have their roots in the "rational" and not in the 
organic. "Interests", too, has, in this context, a meaning of 
"involvement" or "concern" in "something" and that meaning has 
rational overtones. "Resource allocation, and resource arbitration" 
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are obviously rational projects and are part of society dealing xvith 
contracts, agreements etc. The almost total confusion of "rational" 
and "non-rational", "organic"and "contrived" does little to help us 
understand xvhat a "community" is, whether ethnic or political. 
To recapitulate, life, its maintenance and its continuation are 
the primary projects for all animated creatures. All biological units 
must reflect or include those three functions and are called 
"life-moments". An amoeba is a "life-moment" unit because it is a 
"life transmitter", and because it is fully capable of accomplishing 
the continuation of life within its oxvn structure. A man or a xvoman 
cannot be called a "life-moment" unit because neither he nor she is 
capable of accomplishing the continuation of life xvithin its oxvn 
structure. Each man and each xvoman, therefore, cannot be considered a 
biological unit or "xvhole". In order for human life to continue, the 
biological "xvhole" must consist of a mating man and xvoman and txvo 
(male and female) children (because of the absolute dependence of the 
infant human.) As a result, the concepts of "separation" and 
"independence" as definitions or parts of a definition must be 
abandoned or given a nexv meaning. 
Jacques Maritain and Ferdinand Toennies suggest that the concepts 
of "community" and "society" have txvo different meanings and 
foundations. The former has its roots in the biological nature of man 
134 
and is a more "natural" entity, xvhile society reflects a more 
rational, mechanical and artificial nature. Dealing xvith the concept 
of the "community", I have claimed an even stronger biological base 
than either Maritain or Toennies could accept. The biological "xvhole" 
orientation in each man and xvoman is a community by definition. 
Additionally, the orientation requires or includes "other" directed 
feelings and behaviour. Consequently, each man and each xvoman is 
"programmed" genetically, as a result of the chance and necessities of 
evolutionary development, to have communal and social attributes. 
Language is an example where its acquisition is a result of a social 
or communal "program". There is reason to assume that all fundamental 
cognitive functions are genetically "programmed". The only conclusion, 
that I can accept so far is that the "individual" is a phantom and 
that mankind can only be divided into "life-moments" which are the 
final indivisible biological unit or "xvhole". Each man and xvoman are 
parts of a xvhole and that to be considered otherxvise xvould deny the 
fundamental importance of "life" in all animate creatures. 
The "individual" that we are accustumed to conceptualize has 
failed to materialize. In fact, the true biological human "individual" 
is, by nature, already a community. "Separation" "independence" and 
"completeness" are completely lacking in the human "life-moment." To 
consider the biological "part" (male or female) as an "individual" 
existent is almost comparable to considering the detached arm as an 
135 
"individual" existent, i.e., having life of its ovm. While the arm 
has an anatomical attachment to the body, the male or female has a 
"living" functional attachment to the biological xvhole. 
"Separateness", "independence", and "completeness" cannot be attached 
to the male or female except in a purely inanimate spatial 
relationship. "Autonomy", hoxvever, has not been eliminated because 
that xvhich is purely biological is not "self-governing." "Autonomy" 
does not concern itself with "community" for rule-making is an 
activity of "society". 
A viexv of the basic unit of human kind xvhich includes the concept 
of the "life-moment" or the biological xvhole, xvould indicate that 
"community" is an a priori fact. It would give a nexv emphesis to the 
xvords of Bishop Butler xvhen he xvrote: 
That mankind is a community, that we all stand in a 
relation to each other, that there is a public end 
and interest of society which each particular is 
obliged to promote, is the sum of morals. 44. 
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PART 111 
no 
Iii t.xO last section, xve started with i basic biologica1 principle: 
tae reproduction continuance and maintenance of the 1 i ce process. A 
pjrticipait of the 'ifc process is the funlamental biological unit, 
i.e. tie instrumeit through xvhich the reproduction of T i fe continues. 
This "aiological" x/nole consisted of the mating pair and c^^dren 4n 
the family. Any one part, the female, the male or the cVld, is 
unable to repro luce life xvithout the other parts working together as a 
x/hole. In order for the "biological unit" to exist a genetic or 
i'merited "orientation" toxvard the xvhole" must exist in each an I every 
individual. In fact, the individual cannot exist properly xvithout the 
"whole" because of this genetic orientation. The "orientation", 
hoxvever, does not have a fixed content, i.e., the individual is not 
genetically "oriented" toward one mate or even any tyoe of mate, nor 
is tiie individual "oriented" necessarily to only one mate, nor to more 
that one mate. Such decisions are the result of cultural and personal 
experiences. 
Carl Jung introduced a human psyche containing tT">rce major, 
fundamental parts or layers: the collective unconscious, the personal 
unconscious and the conscious. The latter two categories xvere 
ignited, created, Tilled oat or aroused by the experience o^ the 
individual. The collective unconscious, however, vas a genetic 
inheritance from the genetic experiences of the deve^ornent or life 
ai'l of the human species, its contents xvere called "archetypes" and 
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were descriped as primodia! images, even primordial memory images 
shared by every human being. It was a community unconscious because 
everyone shared in it through their genetic being. Tie collective 
unconscious was the foundation, the matrix for the "personal" psyche 
and it formed ana permeated both the personal unconscious and the 
conscious. 
A biological requirement for a "biological x/hole" that was not the 
individual had been discovered, and the organic instrument by w^ch 
this "whole" existed as a being is to be discovered in the "collective 
unconscious". The human unit is community in its being. It cannot be 
otherwise or the xvhole liCe process xvould have been disrupted and man 
xvouLd have ceased to exist. Definitions describing the individual as 
"separate", as a "unit", as "distinct" or as "complete" tail to have 
any meaning in the organic theory of the community described above. 
The human as community is logically, onto'ogically, and historically 
prior to the individual. 
In this section, I xrant to erect the societal ediface on the 
foundations of the community just described. Society, according to 
Toennies and Maritain, is more closely rooted in the rational nature 
of man rather than in the biological or organic nature OL man. While 
I have explored, in a superficial manner, the coMective unconscious 
and its contents an 1 purpose, I have not described the personal 
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unconscious nor the conscious and their contents. It is in at least 
one of the two layers that society must be rooted, and it is in these 
txvo sections that the concept of "autonomy" must find its meaning. 
In his book Man and the State, Maritain states: 
A society always gives rise to communities and community Peelings 
within and around itself. Never can a community (levelop jjrto a 
society, though it can be the natural soil from which some 
societal organization springs up through reason. f Emphasis 
mine)l. 
At first glance, this claim of Maritain's seemed to be common sense. 
A society, being an artifice, a "product of reason and moral 
strength", sets up a mechanical framework (e.g. contract, 
constitution, rules, etc.) xvhich requires voluntary modifications of 
behaviour of the participcnts. Over tine, these modifications become 
"second nature" and become habits of group behaviour - a more 
"community" oriented function. On the other hanl, a "community", 
rooted in the biological or "natural xvill", is barred by its 
non-rational nature to create something that xvas not "natural" but 
mechanical. 
Hoxvever, there are problems xvith Mari tain's conception oc 
"society". The Elks club or the Shrincrs are a "society" or an 
association, i.e., the members voluntarily have participate-1. Yet, an 
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examination of the members x;il] unearth cu'tural and communa1 
similarities, e.g., Iciguage, social strata, education, religion, 
Locality, values, beliefs, etc. T/hy should anyone associate xvith 
another for some time unless they had something in common? More than 
simple expediency or a contract attracts a person to the Elks. There 
must be a communal attraction before there is a "society" or an 
association like the Shriners. Tie same holds true cor a re1igious 
institution. Whereas the belief and feelings of axve are communal 
functions the actual structure and theology arc societal functions, 
i.e., arc rooted in the "rational xvill". Hoxvever, the structure or 
institution serves as a medium to satisfy the expression of communal 
functions, and theology is a rational explanation of the communal 
expression and functions. 
The state, as Toennies claims, can be considered a "society" or 
at least a functional part of society. Much of the machinery ''despite 
being bureaucratic) is rooted in the "rational will". A constitution 
is as much a product of the "rational xvill" as any other creation of a 
group of people, yet it is limited and formed by the community. When 
the Prime Minister of Canada stated pubHcally that "Free enterprise" 
economy no longer existed in Canada, the resulting horrified outcry 
forced him to retract his remarks. It didn't matter t\nt his remarks 
x:ere accurate, he had "attacked" a belief that /as sacrosanct for the 
general puolic. The same feelings ^in^ beliefs are involved in other 
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concepts such as "democracy" and "representation" etc. Tie 
constitution refLects the values, feelings anl beliefs of the people 
to whom it xvill apply. In fact, it is a useless document fas in 
U.S.S.R.) unless it allows for and includes the community or 
communities. A constitution cannot be set up unless the community is 
prior to its construction. 
The community must be prior to the "state" as well. Barrington 
Moore, Jr., claims that the type of "state" and political culture is 
determined by the type of political culture developed in the oast, 
i.e. in a pre-industrial past.2. To graft a democratic fo^m of 
government onto a culture xvithout the traditions of a democratic 
society or the cultural roots necessary for such a society is an 
impossible task. It matters little x/hether or not the constitution or 
type of government is "right", any such attempt will fai1 because the 
"basic" community for such a society does not exist. No "society" is 
possible xvithout a prior community. 
For hundreds of years, Western philosophers and sociologists have 
been trying to "fit" the txvo concepts of the "individual" anl 
"society" together. Hans Saner begins his book, Kant's Political 
Thought, by stating "Politics is based on reason. It begins with the 
use of reason, not xvith the political act." For such a broad claim to 
be true, the "fact" of "community" could not be prior to the 
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"individual" or to society. Kant's "autonomous'' being or reason xvoiikl 
require a "society" or "contract" in order to live as social beings. 
Saner's interpretation of Kant's thought results in the ultimate 
contract theory - a theory long since discarded as an inadequate (if 
not inaccurate) explanation for the origin of society.3. 
Xarl Mannheim, in his book Essays on the Sociology of Culture, 
states: "the individual is the seat of reality and the reality of 
groups is derivative", yet, that "the group approach to the individual 
is more effective than the direct"4. and that the principal thesis is 
"tnat mental processes have a social dimension."5. Tie first part of 
his book is devoted xvholly to the relational problem of the individual 
and society, yet arrives at a conclusion xvhich, in my view, merely 
biurrs the boundaries of each concept. Society is formed by the "vital 
autonomy, or living self-hood of the individuals as social units". 
Often, the problem of origin and nature of "society" is "answered" 
in the very questions the author poses. J.T.J. Srzednicki makes a 
number of assumptions in his question: 
... I begin by searching for the basic, groundfloor questions in 
the field, e.g. "What is the nature of communal co-operation?" -
it then becomes quite clear that xvhat one is asking about has a 
natural nane in English, i.e. "co-operation" 6. 
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Such an analysis leads him to the "natural" conclusion: 
... the communal bond typica;Ly leaves the individuals as separate 
as ever, they are independent though related.... Second"1 y} the 
relations must have a point ail/or be desirable from the point of 
vie,; of the individuals forming the community in question, ror 
then and only then is there any real possibility oc the 
arrangement working in its oxvn right.7. 
The question already assimes "distinct individuals in a mutually 
willed relationship", and the ansxver to the question then shows or 
proves the existence of "listinct individuals in a mutually xrlied 
relationship." 
Pitirim A. Sorokin v/as much more judicious in his analysis or 
society. In his book: Contemporary Sociological Tieories, S he 
classifies the various views of the nature of society. At one extreme, 
there is the "nominalistic or atomistic" conception in xvhich society 
is nothing but individuals. Next is the "functional" viexv in which 
society is the system of interrelated individuals. Although society 
has no reality beyond the individual members, society is different 
from tiie reality of the same inlividuals isolated. At the other 
extreme, there is the "mechanistic" view in xvhich society is like some 
kind or a machine system, and the "organic" viexv in x/hich society has 
a ' iving unity and a reality beyond, its individual members. Locke and 
Rousseau had "atomistic vlex/s" of society, Karl Mannheim (and, some 
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claim, St. Thomas) had a "functional" view, and Jose Antonio Prime de 
Rivera had an "organic" view. It is possible to label some of the 
systems theories as "mechanical," and, certainly, Comte held a 
variation of this viexv. Sorokin goes on to claim that the "organic" 
view was tiie most popular view amongst sociologists at that time. 
In the last section ("community"), I tried to demonstrate that man, 
viewed as a "life-form," is not individual but communal by definition. 
An "Atomistic" viexv of society wouM fail to account for the "communal 
man." Others, however, (xvith the notable exception of John Rawis) also 
declare the "Atomistic" viexv as an inadequate explanation or theory. 
The "functional" view of the interrelated individuals allows each maJe 
or female to be an individual unit although related by the social 
propensities of their nature. Again, this view fails to account for 
man as a "life-form", as a communal biological "xvhole". Tie family is 
an organic "life-form". Comte comes close to this viexv xvhen ho states: 
"domestic relations do not constitute an association, but a union, in 
the full force of the term; and, on account of this close intimacy, 
the domestic connection is of a totally different nature from the 
social."9. He goes on to add that society is a social organism 
dependent upon "the special development of intellectual influences" 
i.e. enlightened reason. However, in society, some individuals are, by 
nature, superior in reason and can command others to submit to them. 
Society, then is hierarchical and authoritarian, due to the "natures" 
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of the people xvithin it. Comte's "society" fails to evoke a 
sympathetic response in the reader, iv^ o feels instinctively that his 
"mechanistic" view fails to include a sense of responsibility, or 
change etc. 
The "organic" viexv has a basic principle that the social existance 
is primary and the individual being is secondary. It views society as 
a unity or as a body of xvhich the parts are members. Society is an 
entity independent of any one individual or the mere sum of the 
individuals. 
Spain is NOT a territory. NEITHER is it an 
aggregate of men and xvomen. Spain is, above all, 
AN INDIVISIBLE DBSfINY. A historical reality. An 
entity, real in itself, xvhich has accomplished -
And xvill yet accomplish in future - missions of 
universal importance. Tierefore, Spain exists: 
1. As something APART from each individual and 
from the classes and groups xvhich constitute it. 
2. As something SUPERIOR to each of these 
individuals, classes and grouns and even to their 
sim total.10. 
Usually one thinks of a bifurcation of the human into two pa*~ts 
"society" and "individual". Hoxvever, for Marx, the individual xvas a 
port of a "class". Others substitute "the family" for the individual. 
Heinrich Von Treitschke did not speak of the "individual" or "society" 
at all: 
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The State is tiie peop^ legacy united as an independent power. By 
"people" xve understand, briefly, a plural number of families 
permanently living together. When this is recognized, it follows, 
that the State dates from the very beginning and is necessarv, 
that it has existed as long as history and is essential to 
humanity as language.... 11. 
"Article Forty One" of the Irish Constitution (1937), states: 
Tie State recognizes the Family as the natural primary and 
fundamental unit group of society, and as a moral institution 
possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and 
superior to all positive laxv. Tie State, therefore, guarantees 
to protect the Family in its constitution and authority, as the 
necessary basis of social order and as indispensable to the 
welfare of the Nation and the State.12. 
In each case, hoxvever, the individual iras oart of an entity 
greater or superior than himself. In the last section, I indicated 
that the male or female xvas but a part of something greater (i.e., the 
biological "xvhole") and that the biological orientation and basic 
categories of cognition are programmed by the genetic code and are 
wholly biological in nature. Ancient China, as was ixrnted out 
earlier, attached so much importance to the family that no ch;id coulr1 
move out of the family home until both parents x/ere dead. Other severe 
social and legal restrictions xvere impose! on the child-en and 
dcsce.idents in order to support the family. An extended family couif1 
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contain numerous generations and descendents. Tribesmen have been 
known to build whole social systems on the principle nc "biood" or 
kinship. Even today Chinese names present the ramily name first. 
Patrician Romans not only had a family name but a tribal or kin name 
as well. Victorian ladies xvere knoxvn to say of a person "blood will 
tell," meaning that the "qualities" of the family (or other members of 
the family) xvill be in the particular person "individual". 
Not only the biological community orientation xvas found in the 
human, but a psycnical community also could be ascribed to the human. 
The unconscious consists of mental process involving a tendency 
behavior or impulse toxvard actions that, seemingly, are xvithout 
purpose and xvhich do not involve rational or conscious thinking. In 
the collective unconscious these impulses involve the inheritel 
archetypes; in the personal unconscious, these impulses have their 
root in the experience of the individual. For Freud, these
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partial cnildhood experiences xvhich are repressed, and all "psychic 
material that lies belo.v the threshold of consciousness." 13. It 
contains xvishes, memories, fears, feelings, and ideas xvhich are not 
subject to conscious awareness yet continually influence the conscious 
processes. We can observe the unconscious at xvork by observing the 
behavior of the individuals. For instance, a man may bite his 
fingernails, make repetitive gestures xvith his ^ ands, foHow the same 
routine dressing in the mornings, etc. More fundamental are the 
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reactions xvhen a cherished symbol or belief is attacked, e. g. 
burning the flag. 
C. H. Cooley xvas instrumental in creating sociology as a viable 
field of study in tie United States. His theories are seldom studied 
today despite his influence on sociological thought at the beginning 
of the twentieth century. I suspect that a good part of the 
explanation for his neglect is the strong organic theory he holds. 
For him tliere is no distinction betxveen the individual and society 
because "the mind is social, and society is mental." Tie individual 
not only has a biological or genetic inheritance but also a social 
inheritance. Tae social inheritance is the "stream of life" the 
absorption of xvhich alloxvs the individual to have all those attributes 
that are identified as human. Cooley talks of society in a manner 
similar to that of Toennies' community and fails to make a clear 
distinction betxveen society and culture. Society provides the 
institutions, the family, the clan, etc; the tools such as language or 
communications; the ideas, values and mores. For him there is no 
distinction betxveen the human mind and society yet the society is 
prior to the individual mind, moulds it, and provides for it a 
foundation. Cooley's theories, then, are an organic description of 
the personal psyche and its contents. In principle, his theories 
indicate that the personal unconscious is the adaptive part of the 
human psyche allowing the individual to absorb the culture about him 
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so that he becomes an integral part of the group to which he belongs. 
It also alloxvs him to fill out those human attributes or tendencies 
xvhich he has genetically inherited, and he "becomes" human as opposed 
to the children supposedly brought up by xvolves etc. xvho never become 
human but remain an animal. It alloxvs the inherited tendency toxvard 
the "self" and "self- Axvareness" to find substance. Tie personal 
unconscious adapts the individual and his inherited instincts, 
tendencies and attributes to a loved xvorld, to a human xvorld. One 
could almost say that the personal unconscious mediates betxveen the 
collective unconscious and the collective or social inheritance. 
Although Erich Fromm would appose the theories of C. H. Cooley and 
Jung, he nevertheless, expressed nicely what I believe to be the 
function of the personal unconscious. 
Man's nature, his passions and anxieties are a 
cultural product; as a matter of fact, man himself 
is the most important creation and achievement of 
the continuous human effort, the record of xvhich xve 
call history. 14. 
Lord Cecil held a viexv less organically oriented than Cooley's, 
yet he claimed that "the mind itself is largely formed and guided by 
the environment of civilization." 15. (Having a concept of 
civilization akin to that of culture). Cooley*s claims are stronger. 
For him there xvere txvo major principles: "the mind is social, and 
that society is mental." 16. He believed that "both persons and 
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groups are organic wholes that move ahead by a tentative process" 17 
and that what xve usually associate as the individual is a fictitious 
entity. The individual mind is a functional part of a xvhole. 
Tie viexv that all minds act together in a vital 
whole from xvhich the individual is never really 
separate floxvs naturally from our groxving knoxvledge 
of heredity and suggestion, xvhich makes it 
increasinly clear that every thought we have is 
linked xvith the thought of our ancestors and 
associates, and through them with that of society 
at large. 18. 
To thinlc of the individual mind even as an abstracted concept is 
impossible. Tie individual mind is so tied to the social, so much an 
integral part of the social that any examination of the individual 
must take place in the group. The individual does not exist apart 
from the social. 
...human nature is not something existing 
separately in the individual, but a group-nature or 
primary phase of society, a relatively simple and 
general condition of the social mind Man does 
not have it at birth; he cannot acquire it accept 
through fellowship, and it decays in isolation. 19. 
...the individual has his being only as part of a 
xvhole. What does not comes by communication and 
intercourse; and the more closely xve look the more 
apparent it is that separateness is an illusion of 
the eye and community the inner truth. 20. 
Tie two major principles by xvhich an individual is created are 
lieredity and communication. What a man does not have by heredity lie 
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has from society through communication. It is society and heredity 
xvhich give to him everything that is human. Society is the vital 
xvhole and society "may be as original or creative as anything else." 
21. The creative individual is as much a part of the "general stream 
of life" as any other individual for creativity is also social in 
origin. 
Innovation is just as social as conformity, genius 
as mediocrity. These distinctions are not betxveen 
what is individual and xvhat is social, but betxveen 
xvhat is usual or established and xvhat is 
exceptional or novel. 22. 
The individual has no separate existence. He is bound into the xvhole 
of xvhich he is a member by both heredity and the social factors in his 
life. Even his heredity in many respects is social as it has "a 
social history in that it has had to adapt itself to past society in 
order to survive" i.e. they have had to undergo "a social test in the 
lives of our ancestors." 23. "Even physical influences, like food and 
climate, rarely reach us except as modified and adapted by social 
conditions." 24. The society is prior historically, logically and 
ontically to the mind of the individual yet cannot be thought of 
xvithout reference to the sum of all human life. Without society, the 
individual could live the life of an intelligent animal but his human 
faculties xvould be lost. 
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It is difficult to understand Cooley's conception of man. He 
considers human life to be a social and inherited process or "stream 
of life". Were xve to think of a rope xve find that strands are xvoven 
or braided into continuous lengths. Each strand has a beginning and 
an end and is not physically connected to other strands except in 
proximity. Each strand is virtually useless, having no strength, no 
purpose, no substantive identity on its oxvn. Each strand carries the 
same limitations into the rope as it is xvoven yet the real xvhole or 
unit is created. It has strength greater than the sum of the parts. 
It has a purpose or use which it bestows on the parts (xve discard 
frayed rope). It is also continuous yet to consider it apart from 
the component strands is impossible. Each strand is lost in the 
continuity of the rope, it gains strength from the continuity, it 
gains its purpose and value from that continuity. 
...life is a creative process,...we are really 
building up something new and xvorth xvhile, 
and...the human xvill is a part of the creative 
energy that does this. Every individual has his 
unique share in the xvork, xvhich NO ONE but himself 
can discern and perform. Although his life flows 
into him from the hereditary and social past, his 
being as a xvhole is nexv, a fresh organization of 
life. 25. 
The nexv, "fresh organization of life" is a nexv fresh organization 
in the individual mind of the social life process, yet individual 
judgement discerns and performs the xvork or role that individual 
performs. Hoxv is it that Cooley's theory alloxvs for "a nexv being" or 
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a "fresh organization of life" and yet is so collectively oriented? 
Cooley's works failed to give me an answer yet I xvould hazard the 
following guess. While the mind of every individual experiences and 
absorbs the culture of the group around him, such experiences and 
absorption does not occur in a fixed or identical manner. Should we 
tell a group of children to mix paints in a boxvl and each child has 
the same number and amount of colours, the mixtures xvould not be 
identical. The children will not start xvith the same colour or with 
the same amount and so on. In a more complex manner, the human psyche 
folloxvs a similar hocus-pocus pattern. The personal unconscious 
grasps experiences and the experiences of each child is different. 
Such a concept does not take axvay from the collective aspect of 
theory. Wittgenstein's famous analogy of the games is an excellent 
one to explain hoxv the txvo concept work xvithin each other. All games 
have a sum of attributes but each game does not have every attribute. 
Let us say that the sum of attributes is as follows: ABCDE. The 
first game is a game because it has ABC and D; the second game has 
ACDE; the third BCDE and so on. Tiey are games because they have so 
many of the set of attributes. Individuals behave in much the same 
manner. No individual has the whole social inheritance but he does 
have as many attributes as he can hold. 
In order to alloxv the "social mind" to become his, the individual 
must inherit aptitudes for the social. Remarkably similar to Jung's 
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concept of the collective unconscious or my "biological xvhole 
orientation", Cooley claims that each individual inherits a social 
predisposition. 
...the child has by heredity a generous capacity 
and need for social feeling, rather too vague and 
plastic to be given any specific name like love. 
26. 
Experience in the group fills out the social predisposition in 
somewhat the same way as xvater fills out a sponge. 
In order for the individual to have a concept of xvhat he himself 
is, the individual has inherited a predispostion for the self xvhich in 
turn needs experience to fill it out. This predisposition is to be 
found in emotions or feelings. 
The emotion or feeling of self may be regarded as 
instinctive, and was doubtless evolved in 
connection with its important function in 
stimulating and unifying the special activites of 
individuals. It is, perhaps, to be thought of as 
a more general instinct, of which anger, etc., are 
differentiated forms, rather than as standing by 
itself. It is thus very profoundly rooted in the 
history of the human race and apparently 
indispensible to any plan of life at all similar to 
ours. It seems to exist in a vague though 
vigorous form at the birth of each individual, and 
like other instinctive ideas or germs of ideas, to 
be defined and developed by experience, become 
associated, or rather incorporated, xvith muscular, 
visual, and other sensations; xvith perceptions, 
apperceptions, and conceptions of every degree of 
complexity and of infinite variety of content; and 
expecially, with personal ideas. 27. 
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It seems that he is claiming that consciousness or the mind is an 
inherited aptitude, predisposition or instinct xvhich is given value 
through experience. It seems to be a logical sequence xvhen one thinks 
of biological development yet it is not a concept to be accepted by 
many theorists. For them, the consciousness transcends the biological 
and instincts. 
...exist...refers to the being xvhich man has 
conquered by transcending and living. 28. 
Tie individual is produced by the biological 
generic process; it is born and it dies. But 
personality is not generated, it is created by 
God 29. 
Cooley's concept of the "inherited self" is not the only concept 
that others xvould attack. For David L. Miller the xvhole underlying 
thesis in Cooley's conception is xvrong. 
Every xvorthy and significant change that is planned 
and deliberately undertaken in a society has its 
origin on the mind of an individual. The 
individual--not the community, not public opinion, 
not external environmental forces--is the source of 
new ideas that enable society to make changes for 
the achievement of ideals 30. 
Any human society, however primitive, is maintained 
by the intentions of its member maintain it 
Any human society is a moral entity. 31. 
The xvhole concept of autonomous individuals in the xvorks of Popper, 
Kant, Bentham and Adler are in fierce opposition to Cooley's theory. 
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Yet Cooley has some indications of support. Reinhold Neibuhr 
claims that 
The individual draxvs the sustenance of his 
self-conscious individuality from his organic 
relation to his social group 32. 
And: 
It is the function of reason to relate life to life 
in terms of harmony. 33. 
In other xvords, reason has an adaptive function. In another 
fascinating little book, Sebastian de Grazia xvrites that xvhile systems 
of beliefs are transmitted culturally and not biologically, they are 
rooted in man's prolonged childhood dependence and infirmity, and for 
all intents and purposes, "they might as xvell be transmitted through 
the genes. In many ways systems of beliefs may be likened to the 
social heredity of the species Homo Sapiens." 34. William McDougall 
speaks of psychobiological as instincts and sentiments of the 
individual person preparing him for his social relationships. It must 
be admitted, hoxvever, that none are as strong in the claims toxvard a 
collectivity as Cooley was. 
What does all of the above mean? I must remind the reader at this 
point, that the purpose of section txvo and three xvas to provide a 
description of a possible alternative to the more commonly held viexv 
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of the individual as the basic human unit i.e. the basic unit of 
society. To defend Cooley's viexvs xvould require effort, time and 
space, all of xvhich cannot be granted in this thesis. I can, hoxvever, 
indicate the possible harmony betxveen the theories of Cooley and of 
those discussed in the previous section. 
In the previous section, I had described hoxv the "biological 
xvhole" or "life- moment" could be considered the basic human unit and 
hoxv as part of its identity, it was already a "community" and could 
not be thought of otherwise. Such a unit xvould require an inherited 
or genetic "orientation" toxvard the "biological whole" and Jung's 
theory of the "collective unconscious" provided an excellent avenue 
for the transmission of an inherited genetic orientation or 
predispostion from one generation to another. Feelings emotions, 
instincts, archetypes etc. xvere the functional means to implement the 
"orientation". Hoxvever, all this involved only the unconscious and 
biological levels. Tie consciousness (and personal unconscious) and 
its contents were not described, although it xvas described as rooted 
in, encircled by, permeated by the collective unconscious from xvhich 
it tentatively emerged. The community xvas the matrix, the foundation 
and guide for the consciousness. Jung stated that it is in the 
conscious psyche that direction intention and purpose xvere to be 
found. It is by using Cooley's theory and Rof's theory that I hope to 
describe the personal psyche and its contents. 
161 
For Cooley, the personal psyche is filled through communication by 
the inherited culture of the groups of xvhich he is a part. The xvhole 
mind of the individual is created by forces not directed by the 
individual: the inherited genetic predispositions, and the inherited 
social mind. Tie individual mind is part of a greater social xvhole. 
The social mind is fed into the personal psyche during the prolonged 
childhood by the primary organic groups i.e. they are fundamental in 
forming the social nature of the individual, and consist of such 
groups as the family, the play-group for children, and the 
neighborhood or community of elders. 35. Fromm has a very similar 
notion xvhich he calls "primary ties" 36. xvhich are organic in the 
sense that they are a part of normal human development. Examples of 
such ties are the child and mother, the tribal man and the clan and 
nature, the medieval man and the church or social caste. Hoxvever, for 
Fromm these are ties to be broken for self-actualization of the 
individual. Rof's viexv is closer to that of Cooley. 37. He claimed 
that the child's earliest dispositon is affected or modified by the 
reactions he awakens in the mother or another guardian figure and 
vice-versa, a process he calls "urdimbre". Because man is so 
premature at birth, he is particularly susceptable to "tutelar 
imprints". Rof's "urdimbre" processes continue xvell into the teenage 
years. In this he followed Jung's example xvho claimed that the 
individual emerged from the collective in stages and that the 
conscious finally matures in the chaos caused by puberty. 38. For 
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Cooley there is no emergence of the individual consciousness from the 
social mind. Instead, the "urdimbre" process continues through the 
individual's life and the individual awakens reactions in his 
communications and vice-versa. 
There are indications that the brain structure itself is affected 
by the tutelar process. Kittens kept in cages with either horizontal 
or vertical bars alone are unable to see lines corresponding to the 
missing bars in later life--i.e., kittens from cages xvith vertical 
bars only xvill be unable to see horizontal lines and so on. 39. 
Children are knoxvn to have a far greater number of synaptic 
connections in the brain in the first txvo years of life but will lose 
almost half of them after two years. This no doubt helps them to 
learn but what is not used is lost. Abraham H. Masloxv indicates that 
the learning process itself may affect the sturcture of the brain. 
Habits are then conservative mechanisms, as James 
long ago pointed out. Why is this so? For one 
thing, because any learned reaction, merely by 
existing, blocks the formation of other learned 
reactions to the same problem. But there is 
another reason, just as important, but ordinarliy 
neglected by the learning theorists, namely, that 
learning is not only of muscular responses but of 
affective preferences as xvell. Not only do xve 
learn to speak English but xve learn to like and 
prefer it. Learning is not then a completely 
neutral process. 40. 
Masloxv xvas interested in behavior and saxv only limits to other forms 
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of behavior. Hoxvever, should the brain be more plastic than xve 
thought, then the learning process through xvhich the "stream of life" 
is absorbed places an indelible synaptic print on the brain. It may 
be impossible for anyone taught to speak English, an atomistically 
oriented language to viexv the xvorld more holistically, as someone xvho 
xvas taught another language xvould: perhaps an agglutinate language 
which reflects a holistic xvorld viexv. 
Whether or not the actual brain structure is affected, the 
personal unconscious certainly is. This part of the psyche, according 
to Jung, requires experience for development and substance, but only 
xvithin the parameters set by the "collective unconscious".. The 
face-to-face encounters or communications moulds the personal 
unconscious and provides it xvith attitudes, values, needs, drives, 
principles, a code of ethics, etc. which in turn affect the conscious. 
The psychological effect of the primary groups on the individual as 
the "result of intimate association...is a certain fusion of 
individualities in a common whole, so that one's very self...is the 
common life and purpose of the group". 41. That such a 
"conditioning" occurs can be demonstrated by the effect a glimpse of a 
xvoman's ankle caused in my great- grandfather's time and in my oxvn; or 
the effect of crunching sheeps eyes xvhile eating or of cooking the 
brains of someone you knoxv. A physical reaction sets in that is 
culturally induced and the agent of such a reaction is the personal 
unconscious. 
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So far, my description of the human has been heavily organic and 
as such involved the genetic or the biological heredity of man. Tie 
personal unconscious is the adaptive and mediating function betxveen 
the collective unconscious, a biological inheritance, and the social 
culture or "stream of life", a social inheritance. The former is 
innate, the later experiential, but both are found as a xvhole in the 
mind or psyche of the individual. Both layers of the unconscious 
psyche permeate the conscious and dominate it to a large extent yet 
most people recognize its existence. Jung indicates that the same 
process occurs in the unconscious psyche and in the conscious. When 
xve are asleep, for example, or mesmerized, the consciousness or 
conscious awareness seems to withdraxv into itself or is greatly 
restricted yet the psyche continues to exist and to act. Some 
sleepwalkers work at a desk and produce excellent and complex xvork. 
Cooley said above that the self is: a feeling or emotion; 
instinctive in nature; and, a functional attribute evolved in order to 
stimulate and unify the special activities of the individual. As an 
instinctive idea, it has to be "defined and developed by experience" 
and deals with "muscular, visual, and other sensations; xvith 
perceptions apperceptions and conceptions of every degree of 
complexity and of infinite variety of content; and, expecially, xvith 
personal ideas." 43. Jung has a similar viexvpoint about xvhat it 
does: "Consciousness seems to stream into us from outside in the form 
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of sense- perceptions, xve see, hear, taste, and smell the xvorld, and 
so are conscious of the xvorld." It also is involved in the processes 
of apperception, recognition, evaluation, volition and intuition. 
Apperception and recognition (identification) involve the function of 
thinking; evaluation also involves the function of feeling; intuition 
is the "perception of the possibilities inherent in a situation 
originating in the unconscious; and volition is directed impulses, 
based on apperception. Apperceptive processes may be either directed, 
e.g. "attention", or undirected--e.g., day dreaming. The former are 
rational the latter are irrational. 44. Jung, hoxvever, does not 
speak of the conscious as an evolved or inherited disposition or 
attribute. Consciousness, as a psychological term, involves an 
awareness of ideas aid feelings, particularily the capacity to knoxv, 
to perceive, or arrange ideas aid feelings in order to have meaning. 
Jacques Monod believes that the capacity is the result of an 
evolutionary biological development. Charles S. Peirce dismissed 
"consciousness" as follows: 
...consciousness in sometimes used to signify the 
"I think", or unity in thought; but that unity is 
nothing but consistency, or the recognition of it. 
45. 
And: 
A reasoning must be conscious; and this 
consciousness is not mere "immediate consciousness, 
" xvhich...is simple feeling viewed from another 
side, but is in its ultimate nature...a sense of 
taking a habit, or dispostion to respond to a given 
king of stimulus in a given king of xvay. 46. 
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Sigmund Freud defined consciousness as that part of the psyche 
that reacts to the outside xvorld and in a continuing interplay, is 
modified and reacting to both the outside xvorld and the changes 
xvithin. 47. However, all organisms "interact" xvith their 
environments, and is there any reason xvhy the more complex the 
organism is, the more complex the mechanism of "interaction" xvould be? 
To "be Axvare", to "perceive", to "apprehend" and to "comprehend" are 
functions of consciousness, yet some animals have all functions (to a 
more limited extent than man). Consciousness is not "a habit to 
respond", but a complex communal interaction. It is the intensity of 
the directed mediation betxveen the external aid the internal that 
seems to identify the human conscious. M. R. A. Chance postulated 
that the ancestors of man had such a variety of stimuli presented to 
them and such a number of fine decisions or judgements to make, that 
the aiimals had to control their emotional responses, such control 
requires the evolvement of enlarged neo-cortex. It xvas this 
anatomical development that allowed the human to evolve. 48. Chance's 
theory provides a nice foundation for the concept expressed by Rene 
Dubos: 
...social groups; like individual persons, never 
react passively with environmental situations; 
instead they respond in a purposive manner. It has 
long been recognized...that the growth of 
civilization is favoured by variable and 
challenging environments--whether the challenge 
comes from topographic, climatic or social stimuli. 
43. 
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Consciousness can be conceived as an inherited biological function 
which responds to stimuli in a "purposive manner" yet the permeations 
of both parts of the unconscious in the conscious severly restricts 
yet ignites the conscious functions. Should a problem arise, the 
individual can solve it if he is patterned to think along the lines 
necessary for solution; and if his personal unconscious has absorbed 
or found the themes of intuitive understanding in the social mind. 
Masloxv indicated that language tends to adopt a certain view of the 
xvorld which makes it difficult, if not impossible, for an individual 
to think of an opposite or more simply another viexvpoint. Clyde 
Kluckhohn adds that many discoveries and inventions are made available 
to a group either as creations of their oxvn members or as trade goods. 
"Hoxvever, only those that fit the total immediate situation in meeting 
the group's needs for survival or in promoting the psychological 
adjustment of individuals xvill become part of the culture." 50. Each 
culture has its oxvn set of trends of thought or set of predispositions 
to thought. 
It is the usual case to describe the tension betxveen the 
individual and society caused by the poxver of the larger entity to 
force the individual to conform and the struggle the individual has 
to maintain to be free. Freud paints a picture of ai ego that must be 
strengthened until it is able to xvithstand the assaults of the 
society. I believe, hoxvever, that a case can be made that the cause 
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of tension in a society is not that of the individual to remain free, 
nor that of the individual who has remained totally a part of the 
xvhole (some tribesmen are unable to even think of the self, but are 
nevertheless happy). The tension comes xvhen the individual has become 
more isolate, more of an individual. Of the three parts of the 
psyche, one is collective by difinition; a second is basically the 
creation of the collective in a locus; and the third, is the other txvo 
parts in and through it, as the ground of its existence and the poxver 
for its actions. When the third part, consciousness, represses the 
other txvo and becomes more individually oriented, an unhealthy psyche 
is created, feelings of anomie and alienation are the results of a 
breakdoxvn or disruption of the harmony of the psyche, the process of 
life or the process of the "life-stream". People begin to lose their 
grip on the human as they become more individualized. 
The human collectivity, hoxvever, is not static, fixed or 
determined. Cooley indicated that each person xvas nexv, was a fresh 
organization. Variation is the norm of the collective social entity 
in the individual minds. This variation is not great for it falls 
xvithin the given social set and xvithin the given social momentum. Tie 
social inheritance that xve have is rippling, alxvays responding to the 
biological development of man, to environmental changes, and to 
changes in technological principles (i.e., the electric toothbrush had 
a minimal affect, if any, on the social process, yet the computer did 
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because of the nexv principle of high-speed knoxvledge involved). Tie 
changes are tentative and meet fierce resistance unless they are 
changes easily accomadated by the existing social process (nexv stars 
on television, or more efficient gasoline). This resistance involves 
the basic nature of man. To make a drastic change in society xvould 
mean a change in the genetic pattern of man; to make a change of great 
but of lesser importance may mean a mere change in the xvhole psyche of 
the human, each and every individual. The reformation xvas a 
revolution in thought and viexvpoint, yet before Luther stood defying 
both the council of the church and the Emperor, four or five hundred 
years of preparation had occurred. 51. The problem at this point is 
to account for change. For this I must present the thought of a 
Spanish humanist and synthesizer of the thought of Freud, and Jung and 
of biology. 
Juan Rof Carballo has xvritten extensively on psycho-biology and 
neuro-physiology and has been hailed as the first major psychoanalytic 
critic of the society and culture of his native Spain. In creating 
his biological aid anthropological models, he introduces the theory of 
"urdimbre". A Spanish xvord that has no similar xvord or concept in 
English, it is usually translated as "xveb", "netxvork", "texture", 
"weave", or "plot" (as in a story). Rof confuses the meaning for the 
English reader further by expanding and adapting the original Spanish 
concept. 
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"Urdimbre" as a theory, involves the child and the parents, and 
the dynamic and mutually modifying relationship involved. (Rof 
reduced the parents to the mother but I have included the father.) 
Rof defined "urdimbre" as "a texture of transactional and reciprocal 
influences betxveen mother and child from the moment of birth." 52. It 
is not a dialectical nor a deterministic process but a "circular 
process xvhich does not permit prediction or an a priori conception of 
xvhich factors in the transaction will be decisive." 53. According to 
Rof, human beings are most susceptible to "transactional and 
programming influences" because, unlike other higher animals, man is 
notably premature at birth. 
"Urdimbre" processes are conditioned by genetic factors but have 
specific functions and characteristics. It is "programmatic" i.e., it 
equips the child xvith a set pattern of behavioxir; it is "psychosocial" 
because it determines the unconscious mechanisms that appear in the 
individual's choices in friendship, marriage, career etc.; and it is 
"transmissional" whereby cultural patterns are passed on from 
generation to generation and presents to the individual a sense of 
tradition. These are accomplished by three main "urdimbre" processes 
that occur at a fairly set time in the development of the personality 
of the child (reminiscent of Chomsky's theory of language 
development). Tie primary "urdimbre" process provides the foundation 
for character formation and is "xvoven" in the first fexv months after 
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birth. Tie "urdimbre" of order co-exists xvith the first process but 
becomes prominent in the fourth or fifth year. By this process, the 
child develops or absorbs social norms aid moral patterns and 
organizes a hierarchical xvorld for the child. The final process 
occurs in adolescence, wherein the child must "confront his 
self-image" xvith the image others have of him in order for him to 
develop a mature personality. 
I have presented Rof's concept of "urdimbre" in some detail for I 
xvish to take that same concept and expand it. Above I have indicated 
a gap betxveen the primative community and the culture of the 
"life-moment" and society. Toennies and Maritain fail miserably to 
explain how such txvo distinct concepts xvith such divergent roots 
"merge". What has occurred between the time of the Tribes of Israel 
and the time of the State of Israel so that man separated by a mere 
four thousand years, could change (I do not say evolve) so 
drastically? What separates man from a primitive tribe and man from 
Toronto or Helsinki? Marx and Engels explain it as folloxvs: 
Some elements are found in all epochs, others are common to a few 
epochs. The most modern period xvill have certain categories in 
common. Pro- duction xvithout them is inconceivable. But although 
the most highly developed languages have laxvs and categories in 
common with the most primitive languages, it is precisely their 
divergence from the general and common features xvhich constitute 
their development. 54. 
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It xvas ai arrogant assumption. Studies since have shoxvn that 
laiguages of some tribesmen are as sophisticated (perhaps even more 
sophisticated in many areas) as any Indo-European language. In 
another place, Marx postulates the folloxving: 
... the "entire so-called history of the world" is nothing but the 
creation of man through human labour.55. 
And: 
In broad outline xve can designate the Asiatic, the ancient, the 
feudal, and the modern bourgeois modes of production as 
progressive epochs in the economic formation of society. 56. 
The latter is a theme that Almond and Verba xvould have approved. 
Man develops through various stages in an almost predetermined pattern 
-for Marx, an economic pattern. As man's purpose and creative or 
transcending labour lifts economic man from one epoch to another, his 
society evolves and advances with him. Western Europe (and North 
America), of course, has evolved further along the path than other 
more primitive cultures. I recall that a primitive Indian tribe in 
Brazil xvas taken out of the jungle and introduced to "civilization." 
Not recognizing the superiority of the Europeanized culture, xvithin a 
few years they returned to the jungle to avoid or stem the corruption 
of their people. 
As mentioned before, Barrington Moore, Jr., does not believe that 
"societies" aid man evolve in a similar manner. For instance, he 
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develops four distinct patterns of change from the pre-industrial to 
the industrial xvorld. The Democratic-capitalist pattern can be seen 
in France, England, and the U.S., yet each had "profoundly different 
societies at the starting point" but xvent through "bourgeois 
revolutions" xvith different alignments of "class" players. For him, 
feudal societies lend themselves to democratic development; 
bureaucratic agrarian societies (Russia, China, Egypt) lend themselves 
to bureaucratic and undemocratic development.57. In other words, our 
society has developed from original societal types and they from prior 
societies until xve reach the very primitive units. 
Tie diversity of man's development, from the stone age tribes of 
the Philippines to the "punk rockers" of our "Atlantic" culture, do 
not indicate any predetermined pattern of development, or even that 
every society xvill or ought to develop. Yet processes of development 
have occurred. Tie introduction of the horse had profound 
consequences for the North American Indian. The development of the 
xvheel, of iron, of money, etc., have had enormous consequences. The 
development of one god by the Jexvs also had profound results. The 
intellectual achievement s of man have been involved in the process 
leading to the development of our present political societies. Yet 
many concepts, drives, principles etc., particularly social and 
communal, have not chaiged. Technological and engineering advances 
are countless. Advances in food gathering (e.g. agriculture, fishing 
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etc.,) and transportation have not been as startling or as numerous. 
Advances in social relations (ethics, morals etc.,) xvould be hard to 
discover, let alone demonstrate. As a result, Plato is still relevent 
yet Ptolymy is not. Aquinas still challenges the intellect, xvhile 
Reginbald of Cologne is an obscure footnote in an equally obscure 
book. 58. Tie "hard" sciences have had amazing success; astronomical 
compared to the social sciences or "soft" sciences. Noam Chomsky 
claims that such lopsided advances in certain areas of endeavor are 
the result of a genetic pattern of thinking. 59. We are unable to 
make advances in certain areas because xve do not have the capacity to 
go outside the inherited set pattern of our brain. Kant's categories 
are another example of a set pattern of thinking. 
Hoxvever, two things must be admitted. Man can and does think 
resulting in innovations. Secondly, man's thinking xvithin his genetic 
pattern is not pre-determined or fixed. Some tribes accepted the 
technological advances of the brass and iron ages but refused to 
settle in fixed areas (e.g., Afgan nomads). Others built magnificent 
cities xvithout xvheels, iron, or brass, etc. Tie "advances of 
progress" have not been uniform in their discovery or adoption. 
Hoxvever, once discovered and adopted, these advances have been 
fundamentally incorporated into the v/oof and xvarp of the process of a 
social "urdimbre" - i.e., the process of civilization. (For the 
moment, I xvish to use "civilization" and "urdimbre" synonymously.) 
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Society cannot be formed directly from the community, for basic 
fundamental communities are unchanging or at least extremely 
intolerant of change. Society (and xve can use the "state" as a prime 
example of a societal institution) changes rapidly or at least is 
capable of rapid change and the state throughout the last three 
hundred years has suffered many changes. Society, rooted in the more 
rational or purposive part of man, is an artifact - a modification of 
xvhat already is - nature, use or design knoxvledge, needs, ideas, and 
values. It is never a static artifact nor is it ever the same 
artifact. Each society is uniquely modified from or in a dynamic and 
on going process of civilization. No society can exist without 
reflecting not only the community and nature, but also the innovative 
advaices and the accepted ideas of its historical past. These 
reflections are never pre-determined because society is based on, even 
created by, the process of civilization. 
A fallaigist architectural theorist, Gimenez Caballero, xvrote in 
his Arte y_ Estado that the city "is the point of balance betxveen the 
individual and society". 60. (The Spanish Fallangists xvere very 
interested in mathematical, particularly geometrical, theories and 
applications, hence the "point of balance" concept.) If one does not 
accept that the "point of balance" is static or fixed, then the city, 
more than any other creation of man, reflects the dynamic, circular, 
reciprocal, traisactional process betxveen man and his society. Nexv 
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innovations are discovered and adopted more readily in cities than any 
xvhere else. Society needs cities or has needed cities in the past 
xvith fexv exceptions (e.g., perhaps the feudal age). Cities alloxv for 
institutions and fixed objective rules or laxvs; for rapid 
communications; for specialized divisions of labour; etc., a variety 
of things that seem to provide fertile ground for innovation and 
social institutions. Philip Rieff makes this comment: 
As cultures change, so do the modal types of 
personality that are their bearers.... Yet a 
culture survives principally, I think, by the poxver 
of its institutions to bind and loose men in the 
conduct of their affairs xvith reasons which sink so 
deep into the self that they become commonly aid 
implicitly understood - xvith that understanding of 
which explicit belief and precise knowledge of 
externals xvould show outxvardly like the tip of an 
iceberg. 61. 
Hoxvever, this is but a part of the process xvhich in turn had 
created the institutions, xvhich changes or modifies them and xvhich 
will supercede them. Culture itself, xvhich Rieff considers as the 
primary "stuff" of social interaction, is an institution created by 
the urdimbre or civilization process. For example, John U. Nef, in 
his book, Cultural Foundations of Industrial Civilization 62 
indicates that there xvere txvo distinct early industrial processes in 
Europe as a result of both conscious and unconscious patterns of 
thought. Because of economic, political, religious, and social 
institutions, an industrial process favouring quality and artistic 
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endeavors arose in France xvhich xvas aided by conscious policies of the 
French crown. As a result of dissimilar patterns set by similar 
institutions in Britain and Holland, an industrial process favouring 
quantity and production xvas formed. The institutions, in turn, had 
their patterns set by xvar or lack of it, innovations or the lack of 
them,ideas, values institutions, accidents, etc., in previous times. 
Tnere xvas a process in which the environmental values and the 
mental or social values reciprocally influenced each other in a 
dynamic and continuous fashion,xveaving the various social and 
environmental values into a new ongoing interaction, into a continual 
xvhole. It is an "urdimbre process" which involves the xvhole culture 
and society. Tie unconscious psyche is in constant mutually modifying 
relationship xvith the conscious, purposive psyche acting on the xvorld. 
The human psyche takes into itself the surrounding environment 
(non-social environment) in order to cope xvith problems to provide 
solutions, and to maintain itself in a hostile xvorld. By its 
perception, and apperception of the world, and by the unconscious 
psyche's "patterning" the human is able to adapt itself to change. 
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